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The UNFCCC predicts that it is highly likely that global warming will cause sea-level 
rise and coastal inundation and that may cause extensive damage to coastal 
property owners. There is little we can do to prevent these coastal hazards, but we 
can adapt to climate change. This dissertation explores the possibility of the 
existence of a legal duty to adapt to climate change in the legal jurisdictions of 
Queensland, Australia and South Africa. It is argued that such a duty will most likely 
fall on the government of a legal jurisdiction. The relevant policy and statutory 
planning regimes of both jurisdictions is firstly explored, from wide overarching 
environmental policies to more specific planning statutes. Ge erally, the various 
policies and statutes in both jurisdictions require public authorities to integrate 
climate change considerations into planning decisions and decisions relating to 
environmental impact assessments, but this cannot be said to be a legal duty to 
adapt to climate change. It is then explored whether the duty can be said to exist in 
common law. The common law is an ill-suited instrument to deal with modern 
issues such as climate change, owing to its roots in the industrial era. However, it is 
inherently flexible and is capable of being developed by the courts. Its application in 
the public sphere is restricted by the doctrine of the separation of powers and so-
called ‘tort-reforms.’ The focus of this inquiry is on the ‘duty of care’ doctrine of the 
tort of negligence as applied in Australia and the element of ‘unlawfulness’ in the 
South African delictual system. The possibility of there being a duty of care on the 
Queensland and Commonwealth government towards coastal private property 
owners to adapt to climate change is dependent on the interpretation of tort 
reforms and the development of rules regulating the role the judiciary plays in 
policy-making. In South Africa, whether it is unlawful for the State to omit to adapt 
to climate change might well depend on State resources and the interpretation of 
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It is a widely held view that even if the earth’s human inhabitants fully desist in their 
activities releasing carbon emissions into the earth’s atmosphere, the current global 
warming trend will persist for decades to come.1 However, since no nation on earth 
can claim to have the political will to undertake cutting its carbon emissions to zero, 
it is imperative that humans adapt to live with the consequences of global warming. 
A gradual rise in the earth’s temperature is projected to significantly affect the lives 
of coastal inhabitants, as sea levels are highly likely to rise and coastal storms are 
predicted to become more severe as we head deeper into the 21st century. A failure 
to adapt may result in extensive coastal property damage and even the loss of lives 
and livelihoods.  
In a lawless society, damage, such as the damage described above, will always ‘rest 
where it falls.’ However, under industrial age law, there are legally recognised 
circumstances in which the burden of damage is shifted from one individual to 
another.2 These circumstances can be found in government policy, statutory law 
and in the common law. These sources of law occasionally provide that the burden 
of damage falls on the State,3 an entity often thought of as the trustee over the 
natural and human environment. A duty to take measures to guard against coastal 
damage likely to be inflicted by changing weather conditions may thus be found in 
government policy, therefore obviating the need to establish such a duty at 
common law and improving the chances of success in a claim for damage to coastal 
private property.4 On the other hand, in the absence of a clear duty on the State to 
adapt to climate change, the common law may be a useful tool for finding 
government liable for future damage related to a failure to adapt to climate change 
                                                          
1
 Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth 
Assessment Report, Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for 
Policymakers (2007) 17 
2
 Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ The Law of Delict (2006) 3 
3
 In this dissertation, ‘State’ shall refer to the government bodies at national level, whereas ‘state’ 
shall refer to federal division of a country, such as Queensland in Australia. 
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in the present day, and hence imposing a duty on government, albeit 
retrospectively.   
In this dissertation, the climate change adaption law of Queensland and that of 
South Africa will be scrutinised and compared. The Queensland coast is highly likely 
to be affected by violent episodes of future subtropical precipitation and sea level 
rise, making it particularly vulnerable to climate change. Queensland, an Australian 
state, is situated in a developed country that is presumably in a good position to 
adapt to climate change due to its relatively greater adaptation capacity. It is also 
worth looking at this state’s adaptation regime because it is regarded as probably 
the most comprehensive climate change adaption regime in Australia. The English 
common law system is applied throughout Australia and thus also forms part of this 
regime. Retrospective liability for climate related damage is regulated by the law of 
tort in this country. South Africa’s climate change regime, on the other hand, is less 
comprehensive even though it too is vulnerable to the effects of climate change, 
but for different reasons. Unlike Queensland, no climate change hotspots have 
been identified, but even slight changes in coastal weather patterns can cause 
significant damage to poor South Africans that are relatively deprived of adaption 
capacity. The South African common law system is classified as Roman-Dutch Law, 
and the law of delict is relevant to retrospective liability allocation.   
The dissertation can therefore be said to follow a functionalist5 approach in that it 
will be assumed that these two legal systems respond rationally to a common 
problem, but in different ways. In comparing the application of a common problem 
in two different legal systems, one can identify where one system fails to 
sufficiently address the problem and where one system is more efficient, cost-
effective or conceptionally sound in solving the problem. In this way, one 
jurisdiction with relative weaknesses in addressing the climate change problem can 
                                                          
5
 Roederer CJ ‘Working the common law pure: developing the law of delict (tort) in light of the spirit, 
purport and objects of South Africa’s Bill of Rights’ (2009) 26(2) Arizona Journal of International and 












learn from the other jurisdiction that is relatively effective at addressing the same 
problem. 
However, for the sake of brevity, an all-embracing comparative study will be 
avoided in this dissertation. Firstly; although it is noted that climate change is 
predicted to affect the coastal zone, agriculture, State infrastructure, biodiversity 
and human health,6 the dissertation shall solely address the issue of likely future 
damage to coastal private property inflicted by accentuated coastal hazards 
resulting from sea level rise, coastal floods, coastal inundation and increased coastal 
erosion. These effects of climate change, particularly sea level rise, are said to be 
the most predictable consequences of climate change7 and will hence provide the 
below legal and philosophical arguments with more authority than would the other 
predicted future effects of climate change.  
Secondly, it is acknowledged that modern environmental statutes consist of various 
elements, such as institutional arrangements; appeals and reviews; compliance 
mechanisms; and planning and regulatory devices. The dissertation shall focus on 
the latter, although short references to the other elements cannot be entirely 
avoided since certain planning and regulatory devices must be understood in the 
correct context.  
Thirdly, the law of delict and the law of tort are complex legal systems that simply 
cannot be discussed as a whole in this dissertation. The dissertation must therefore 
be delimited to a discussion on certain key elements in the tort/delict systems. Only 
the intricacies of the ‘duty of care,’ concept, a requirement for establishing a tort of 
‘negligence’8 in Australian common law will, in the course of this dissertation, be 
scrutinised, keeping in mind the limitations imposed by statutory law in Queensland 
and the specific rules relating to private claims in damages against government.9 
                                                          
6
 See for instance Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary 
for Policymakers (2007) 
7
 Farber DA ‘Adapting to climate change: who should pay?’ (2007) 23 (1) Journal of Land Use 1 at 9  
8
 Balkin RP and Davis JLR Law of Torts (2004) 199 
9












Although there are no equivalents to the ‘duty of care’ concept in South African 
delictual law, the concept of ‘unlawfulness,’ one of the five elements that needs to 
be shown for an act or omission to constitute a delict, is often associated with the 
‘duty of care’ concept in English tort law. The Roman-Dutch law of delict requires an 
applicant to prove five elements10 in order for it to be successful in a claim of 
damages. The element of ‘unlawfulness’ (or ‘wrongfulness’) will be the focus of this 
dissertation owing to its importance in establishing a legal duty on the defendant.11 
Both elements, ‘wrongfulness’ and ‘duty of care,’ serve as mechanisms that guard 
against limitless liability in delict12 and tort13 respectively. They are thus significant 
hurdles that need to be surmounted by a plaintiff in a ‘problem’ such as the one 
identified above. Moreover, these two elements are strongly associated with the 
word ‘duty.’ Seeing that this dissertation is dedicated to establishing a duty to adapt 
to climate change, it is apposite to compare the two common law systems’ 
retrospective duty allocating mechanisms.   
A functionalist comparison is not complete without a brief discussion of the 
common problem that will be applied to the two legal regimes respectively. In 
chapter 2, a rapid appraisal of the implications of climate change for both coastal 
regions, as per the scientific community, will be conducted. Adaptation methods 
and adaptation responsibility will also be covered in the same chapter. Chapter 3 
deals with domestic policy and statutory frameworks of relevance to climate change 
the two legal jurisdictions. This chapter divides into four subsections. In 3.1, the 
international adaptation regime will cursorily be addressed; 3.2 deals with the 
Australian and Queensland adaptation regime; the South African adaption regimes 
is covered in 3.3; and analyses and comparison of the two domestic regimes can be 
found in 3.4.  
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 Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ The Law of Delict (2006) 3-5; these elements are ‘conduct,’ 
‘unlawfulness,’ ‘negligence,’ ‘causation’ and ‘damage.’ 
11
 Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ The Law of Delict (2006) 137-138; the authors, however, 
warn against confusing the element of fault with that of the English Law concept of ‘duty of care.’ 
12
  See, for instance, Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton (2004) 2 SA 216 (SCA) at para 35 
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Chapter 4 addresses the issue of the relevance of the common law for climate 
change adaptation. This chapter divides into ‘the role of the common law in the 
environmental context’ (4.1), ‘a duty to adapt to climate change under tort law’ 
(4.2) and ‘a duty to adapt to climate change under the law of delict’ (4.3). In 4.1, the 
limitations of statutory frameworks are discussed in the first subsection, 4.1.1 and 
4.1.2 then addresses the rise and recognition of the common law in the 
environmental context. The problems with the role of the common law in the 
environmental context are discussed in 4.1.3 followed by a discussion of the 
manner in which the common law sought to overcome these problems in 4.1.4. ‘A 
duty to adapt to climate change under tort law’ is the title of section 4.2 and applies 
the ‘duty of care’ concept in the climate change context. It starts with a discussion 
on the general principles of the tort of negligence in 4.2.1, then continues in 4.2.2 to 
address the more specific principles that apply in the ‘duty of care’ concept and 
ends off with a general exposé of factors that impact on the application of the duty 
concept. In 4.3 a similar structure is followed, but discusses climate change in the 
context of the South African common law. An overview of the general principles of 
the law of delict is found in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 addresses the basic requirements for 
establishing unlawfulness under the law of delict, including the impact of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa on this element of  delict. There are also 
factors that impact on the application of duty in delict, and these will be discussed 
in 4.3.3. The final section, 4.4, compares the duty to adapt to climate change under 
tort law and the law of delict and a conclusion is reached in chapter 5.   
2. The Climate change adaptation imperative  
2.1 The need to adapt 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) data suggests that the 
earth has warmed significantly since the dawn of the industrial age. This 
unprecedented increase in the earth’s temperature can be ascribed to the use of 
Greenhouse Gases (Ghg’s) in industrial activity. The amount of Ghg’s already in the 
atmosphere will perpetuate this global warming trend, even if the release of Ghg’s 












further temperature hike is also predicted to affect the world’s climate patterns and 
distributions, commonly known as the phenomenon of ‘climate change.’14 The exact 
extent and implications of climate change is not known, but certain models and 
predictions make it clear that climate change and its concomitant repercussions are 
inevitable.15 From a land use planning context, these repercussions warrant the 
infiltration of certain ‘climate change’ standards and codes into planning laws and 
instruments in order to ensure the continual harmonious development and in some 
instances, existence of coastal human settlements.16 In other words, it is imperative 
for human settlements to adapt to the effects of climate change. The effects that 
must be heeded by those planning for future development of the coastal zone are 
sea-level rise, increased incidences and severity of floods, coastal inundation and 
incrementally more expeditious coastal erosion.17 
It is also trite that the climate change will affect different regions of the world in 
different manners. Some regions are particularly vulnerable to climate change on 
account of their geographic location and socio-economic circumstances.18 North 
eastern Australia and Southern Africa are not critically threatened by predicted 
effects of climate change, but inhabitants, planners and policymakers for the 
coastal zone in these reg ons can ill afford apathy toward climate change 
adaptation. Climate change is highly likely19 to result in increased incidences of 
severe storm events (and the severity of these events) associated with heavy 
precipitation, thus increasing the risk of flooding and coastal erosion in Queensland, 
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 Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth 
Assessment Report, Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for 
Policymakers (2007) 
15
 Ibid; at 18 
16
 Mace MJ ‘Adaptation under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: The International 
Legal Framework’ in Adger, et al Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change (2006) 53 at 55 
17
 Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth 
Assessment Report, Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for 
Policymakers (2007) at 18 
18
 Mace MJ ‘Adaptation under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: The International 
Legal Framework’ in Adger, et al Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change (2006) 53 at 54-55 
19
 Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth 
Assessment Report, Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for 












Australia. The Queensland coast is also likely to be affected by sea level rise and 
increasing incidences of extremely high sea levels, thus contributing also to coastal 
inundation.20 Needless to say, coastal structures are in danger of being severely 
damaged if these risks eventuate, especially in a state where 85% of the population 
live within the coastal zone and where the population growth is in excess of 9%.21 
Urban ‘hotspots’ where urban adaptation is most needed were identified as being 
South East Queensland (including the city of Brisbane) and the Wet Tropical Coast 
(including the city of Cairns).22 Climate change will disproportionately affect 
communities with limited adaptive capacities, such as the Torres Strait Islanders 
who, without sufficient access to support facilities in their relatively isolated 
location, are at risk of future inundation.23 
The effect of climate change on South Africa will be largely similar, in that a change 
in precipitation patterns are highly likely to accompany the increase in temperature, 
and events of precipitation is highly likely to be more severe, and occur more 
frequently. The eastern half of the country is expected to become wetter and the 
western half drier. Low lying urban areas in the coastal zone are therefore in danger 
of being affected by floods, erosion, sea level rise and therefore inundation.24 
Durban and parts of Cape Town25 can be identified as potential ‘hotspots’ owing to 
their proximity to the sea and its urbanised nature. Although less than half of the 
South African population lives in the coastal zone, coastal cities, especially Durban 
and Cape Town are growing at a rapid rate.26 As many as 2.7% of the South African 
population is reported to move to urban centres annually to seek work, which is 
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 PMSEIC Independent Working Group Climate Change in Australia: Regional Impacts and 
Adaptation – Managing the risks for Australia (2007) at 13-18  
21
 Queensland Government Queensland State Coastal Management Plan (2001) at 8-9; mainly due to 
urbanisation and large scale settlement in Queensland 
22
 PMSEIC Independent Working Group Climate Change in Australia: Regional Impacts and 
Adaptation – Managing the risks for Australia (2007) at 24 
23
 Ibid at 28 
24
 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South Africa Environment Outlook: A Report on 
the State of the Environment – Executive Summary and Key Findings (2006) at 5-6  
25
 See Mukhiebir P and Ziervogel G Framework for Adaptation to Climate Change in the City of Cape 
Town (2006) and Bouchard B et al Improving Flood Risk Management of Informal Settlements in the 
City of Cape Town (2007) 
26












resulting in an increase in the informal settlements and poverty rates in cities.27 
Seventy three percent of the urban population in Southern Africa already live in 
peri-urban informal settlements.28 People in these settlements are poor and do not 
have the adaptive capacity necessary to guard against the future effects of climate 
change. This places immense pressure on local and provincial authorities in urban 
South Africa charged with planning, providing access to housing and service delivery 
responsibilities to take these adaptive measures on the informal settlements’ 
residents’ behalf.29 Moreover, coastal developments in the past have proceeded 
with scant consideration for the impact on the coastal zone and therefore exposed 
settlements to the future effects of climate change, such as sea level rise, 
inundation and coastal erosion.30 There is also reason to believe that this continues 
to be the trend, especially along the south and southeast coast of South Africa.31 
2.2 How to adapt 
The above paragraphs make it clear that the climate change impacts necessitate the 
adoption of adaptation measures. Furthermore, it is often argued that a 
precautionary approach must be adopted when considering adaptation measures, 
so that the uncertainty that exists as to the precise impact of climate change is not 
used as an excuse to avoid or delay action to enhance adaptive capacity.32 Two 
more issues need to be elaborated to lay a proper foundation for this dissertation: 
the type of adaptation measures and the entities responsible for taking adaptation 
measures. 
                                                          
27
 Kruys GPH ‘Population growth: its effect on human security with emphasis on South Africa’ (2008) 
40 at 51-53 
28
 Kok P and Collinson M Migration and urbanisation in South Africa (2006) at 26-27 
29
 Kruys GPH ‘Population growth: its effect on human security with emphasis on South Africa’ (2008) 
40 at 51-53 
30
 Scheier SM ‘A coastal zone management policy for South Africa: some perspectives’ (1997) 4 
SAJELP 167 at 170 
31
 Glazewski J ‘Towards a coastal zone management act for South Africa’ (1997) 4 SAJELP 1 at 2-4 
32
 McDonald J ‘A risky climate for decision-making: the liability of development authorities for 
climate change impact’ (2007) 24 EPLJ 405 at 406; McDonald J ‘The adaptation imperative: managing 
the legal risks of climate change impacts’ in Bonyhady T and Christoff P Climate Law in Australia 
(2007) 124 at 126-127; See article 3 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 












From a coastal zone land use planning perspective, the adaptation process can be 
described as ‘minimising sensitivity or exposure to risk by increasing resilience; 
improving the capacity of individuals, organisations and communities to cope with 
damage...’33 and may take the form of event protection, damage protection 
(accommodation) and risk acceptance.34 As the name suggests, event protection 
involves taking measures against extreme climatic events such as storms and 
cyclones. These measures may involve ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ engineering solutions such as 
the construction of seawalls, beach replenishment and the conservation of coastal 
wetlands. Damage protection includes damage avoidance whereby further 
development is prohibited in the coastal zone, and damage mitigation whereby 
strict building codes are applied to buildings situated in the coastal zone. Lastly, risk 
acceptance involves either taking no action against the risk or implementing a 
system of planned retreat from the coastal zone.35 The type of adaptation measure 
taken will depend on the risk inherent at a specific site. High risk areas will typically 
involve a planned retreat policy, whereas low risk areas necessitate only event 
protection.  
2.3 Adaptation responsibility 
A further consideration is the apportionment of the cost of taking the above 
measures. It is clear that adaptation is not free, and given the novelty of the 
concept of ‘climate change adaptation,’ authors and policy-makers are still divided 
on where the cost of implementing these measures must rest. Farber36 believes this 
would depend on the importance society attaches to the goals of climate change 
adaptation. The author identifies behavioural goals,37 loss-spreading,38 just 
                                                          
33
 McDonald J ‘The adaptation imperative: managing the legal risks of climate change impacts’ in 
Bonyhady T and Christoff P Climate Law in Australia (2007) 124 at 126 
34
 McDonald J ‘A risky climate for decision-making: the liability of development authorities for 
climate change impact’ (2007) 24 EPLJ 405 at 406 
35
 McDonald J ‘The adaptation imperative: managing the legal risks of climate change impacts’ in 
Bonyhady T and Christoff P Climate Law in Australia (2007) 124 at 126 
36
 Farber DA ‘Adapting to climate change: who should pay?’ (2007) 23 1 Journal of Land Use 1 at 19-
25 
37
 See Kaplow L ‘An economic analysis of legal transitions’ (1986) 99(2) Harvard Law Review 509 511-
512 for an analysis of how law can change future behviour. One of the ways in which this may 












desserts,39 as well as distributive and social goals40 as the main aims of climate 
change adaptation. A conclusion is reached that, from a moral standpoint, it is 
desirable for polluters to carry the financial burden of adapting to climate change. 
Not only would such an arrangement give emitters their just dessert, it would also 
change the behavioural patterns of polluters in that it will become expensive to 
pollute. Requiring wealthy polluters to bear the adaptation burden for those most 
vulnerable to climate change, the poor, would also satisfy Farber’s final criterion: 
‘distributive and welfare goals.’41  
The next most morally appealing option for Farber is ‘the public pays.’ According to 
this doctrine, climate change adaptation funds are acquired from the fiscal purse. 
The ‘distributive and welfare’ effects of such an arrangement are obvious: everyone 
makes a small contribution towards adaptation funds so that even those without 
adaptive capacity are protected from future climate ills.42 Some suggest that the 
taxation collected from emitters be ear-marked for climate change adaptation, 
which will accordingly be devised and implemented by the government in its 
position of trustee over the general public.43 In this way, emitters will still get their 
                                                                                                                                                                    
climate change responsibility is attributed to local authorities, the latter will ensure that their 
planning policies incorporate measures to guard against climate change.   
38
 Farber DA ‘Adapting to climate change: who should pay?’ (2007) 23 1 Journal of Land Use 1 at 22-
23 Since only random portions of the population suffers loss from climate change, it would only 
seem fair to some that the loss is spread over the entire population. 
39
See Adler MD ‘Corrective justice and liability for global warming’ (2007) 155 U.Pa.L. Rev 1859 for an 
account of the role of the theory of ‘just dessert’ in climate law. This goal encompasses the theories 
of corrective justice and unjustified enrichment. It involves moral arguments to apportion blame for 
certain conduct. The wrongdoer must restore the moral imbalance. Furthermore, those that profited 
under certain conditions owe a moral duty to recompense another that has lost out at their expense.  
Those to blame for climate change would get their just dessert if they are ordered to pay for 
adaptation measures.  
40
 See Deitz S ‘The impacts of climate change: perspectives from the Stern Review’ (2007) XIII (2) 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 173 at 178-179 for the disproportionately acute effect of climate 
change on the relatively poor nations and the poor within nations. Policy, at international or national 
level, affects the distribution of income and wealth and therefore may either harm or benefit those 
worst off in society. According to this goal, an adaptation policy must favour those worst off in 
society.   
41
  Farber DA ‘Adapting to climate change: who should pay?’ (2007) 23 1 Journal of Land Use 1 See 
the table on page 34 for a summary. 
42
 Ibid at 28-29 Such an argument is particularly strong if the government agencies involved have 
sufficient human, financial and technical resources to implement and monitor adaptation 
programmes.  
43












just desert and the temptation to engage in ‘moral hazard’ practices might well be 
suppressed.  
Wherever the burden of bearing adaptation cost falls, it only seems viable only for 
the government to undertake adaptation action. State agencies presumably have 
the human resources and expertise to implement adaptation programmes and have 
many times pronounced their trusteeship over the environment (including the 
human environment).44 It is crucial that public authorities consider it necessary for 
them to take pre-eminent action against climate change at this critical juncture in 
human history.45 The following paragraphs of this dissertation will be devoted to 
establishing whether the Australian, Queensland and South African governments 
have assumed responsibility for protecting its people against climate change 
impacts and, if so, to what extent. 
3. Domestic policy and statutory frameworks of relevance to climate 
change adaptation 
3.1 International adaptation regime 
There is no legal duty on individual nations to take adaptation action in 
international law, though they are strongly urged to build adaptive capacity as soon 
as is practicable. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)46 identifies principles that should guide climate change adaptation 
implementation, which includes intergenerational equity, common but 
differentiated responsibilities and most importantly, the precautionary principle.47 
                                                          
44
 See for example the South African framework environmental act, the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 Sec 2(4)(o). 
45
 Some believe that if the world’s carbons emissions are not drastically decreased now, climate 
change will have catastrophic future effects – see, for example, Dietz S ‘The impacts of climate 
change: perspectives from the Stern Review’ (2007) XIII(2) Brown Journal of World Affairs 173  
46
 This instrument is not yet regarded as ‘hard law’ that imposes legal obligations on parties; rather it 
has mere persuasive force as a soft law at international level. Only ‘final’ conventions and customary 
international law qualify as hard law. The document can neither be said to be a final convention nor 
can it be said that its principles and obligations have hardened into customary international law. This 
process requires these obligations and principles to be practiced by states and regarded by states as 
binding. The uncertainty that surrounds the precise manner in which climate change is going to 
affect nations has caused members to postpone taking adaptation measures. 
47












In accordance with the latter principle, parties are required to take ‘precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and 
mitigate its adverse effects’ and where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty ‘should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures.’48 This principle must thus be kept in mind by the 
parties when implementing their commitments under this framework convention. 
One of these commitments is the imperative to formulate and implement national 
programmes to facilitate adequate adaptation.49 Both South Africa and Australia are 
parties to this convention and hence are expected to devise and publish national 
adaptation programmes of action50 (to use the language of the convention).  
Climate change adaptation was also the subject of discussion at the Copenhagen 
Conference on Climate Change in 2009. The basis for the discussion was laid by 
certain guidelines for the development of adaptation provisions adopted at the 13th 
sitting of the Conference of the Parties in Bali two years earlier, called the Bali 
Action Plan.51 In working towards a decision at Copenhagen, the Parties were urged 
to enhance action on adaptation by, inter alia, undergoing vulnerability assessments 
so that priority areas of adaptation can be identified. Furthermore, Parties were 
required to integrate adaptation actions in sectoral and national planning, enable 
climate resilient development and to reduce vulnerability generally. Lastly, risk 
management and risk reduction strategies were recommended as well as disaster 
management strategies and means to address loss and damage associated with 
climate change impacts.52 
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 Ibid article 3 
49
 Ibid article 4.1(b) 
50
 Henceforth, NAPA 
51
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Two years later, at the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, 
not much progress had been made in developing international law on climate 
change adaptation. It was suggested that a Copenhagen Adaptation Framework on 
Implementation is adopted in order to identify and clarify the Parties’ adaptation 
duties in international law.53 It was then also strongly argued that this programme 
must follow a ‘country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory approach to 
adaptation’ and must be based on the principles of good governance, mutual 
accountability with the aim of integrating adaptation actions into relevant social, 
economic and environmental policies.54 More specifically, Parties were invited to 
draft specific national adaptation programmes of action based on each Party’s 
development priorities. This would entail initiating or improving risk assessments 
and consequently reducing the risk of climate change by means of effective and 
relevant specific national programmes of action.55 Certain options on the content of 
the Programme were put before the Parties, but the Programme was not adopted. 
A report56 identical to the above one was released by the Conference of the Parties 
at the conclusion of the Conference in an attempt to continue discussions at the 
next session. Despite the absence of a definite obligation at international level on 
states to prescribe and take adaptation measures, the Australian, Queensland and 
South African governments respectively have attempted to make provisions for 
adaptation action through certain policies and statutes. The degree to which the 
relevant policies and statutes create adaptation duties, either directly or by 
integrating adaptation considerations into social, economic or environmental 
policies for the State agencies of these jurisdictions will be analysed below.      
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3.2 Australian and Queensland adaptation regime 
3.2.1 Relevant policies 
The framework Australian policy on the environment is the National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD).57 It serves to integrate the notion of 
ecologically sustainable development into decision-making processes. According to 
the policy, this involves considering the social, economic and environmental 
implications of decisions at international, national, state and local levels and taking 
a long-term view when taking decisions and actions.58 Such an approach, it 
postulates, will decrease the possibility of serious environmental impacts arising 
from economic activity.59 Its overall goal is to improve quality of life by improving 
community well-being and welfare and the welfare of future generations. In doing 
so, decisions must be guided by the precautionary principle, the ‘integrated 
approach,’ and public participation.60 The importance of ecologically sustainable 
development and the precautionary principle in climate change adaptation regimes 
has already been mentioned.61  
More pertinent to a dissertation f cussing on coastal planning measures, is that 
governments must seek to improve the safety and aesthetic amenity of urban areas 
and work to retain and improve natural ecosystems within urban areas.62 The safety 
of people and property in the coastal zone must thus be a consideration when 
undertaking coastal development. Retaining and improving essential coastal 
processes and ecosystems such as wetlands and estuarine areas is also an effective 
way to adapt to climate change in that it may mitigate coastal inundation by 
absorbing water and the impact of storm surges. Moreover, environmental impact 
assessment mechanisms and coastal zone management measures must be in line 
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with the principles of ESD. Scientific uncertainty will therefore be no excuse to 
shrug off adaptation responsibility in the coastal zone or in the Environmental 
Impact Assessment process. In addition, integrated coastal zone management is 
required by the policy – ‘integrated’ in the sense of intersectoral integration, 
intergovernmental integration and spatial integration (the land and sea at the 
coastal region must be managed as a whole)63 in coastal zone management.  
Another overarching Australian policy is the Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment (IGAE).64 The IGAE was essentially adopted as part of the 
Commonwealth’s approach of ‘co-operative federalism’ in the 1990s. Although its 
focus is co-operative environmental governance, it nevertheless gives us insight into 
standard principles and values to be adopted by all government bodies involved in 
environmental governance.65 Firstly, it requires that relevant environmental 
considerations are incorporated into decisions at all levels of government and that 
the results of a proper environmental examination into the potential impact of a 
decision must inform such decisions. Secondly, the precautionary principle and 
inter-generational equity must guide decisions impacting on the environment. 
Thirdly, schedule 5 states that the ‘national greenhouse response strategy’ must 
contain ‘measures for adapting to the impact of climate change.’ In conclusion, this 
agreement which prescribes the application of the precautionary principle for all 
decisions affecting the coastal zone, may well require an examination of climate 
change impacts on the coastal zone before a decision is taken and makes it 
peremptory for the national climate change strategy to include climate change 
adaptation measures.   
The chief document dealing with climate change adaptation on national level in 
Australia is the Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) National Climate Change 
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Adaptation Framework of June 2007.66 The goal of this document is to ‘reduce the 
risks of climate change and to realise any opportunities’ by devising targeted 
strategies that will build the country’s adaptive capacity to deal with climate change 
impact in key sectors and regions in the medium run (5-7 years).67 Importantly, it 
recognises that government will take the lead in adapting to climate change. The 
Commonwealth government, the state (and territory) governments and the various 
local authorities must adopt coordinated approaches to understanding and 
preparing for the effects of climate change. This entails, inter alia, developing, 
implementing and reviewing climate change adaptation policies and strategies, 
including regulations, standards and economic instruments. This also means that 
climate change considerations must be integrated into existing policies and 
strategies.68 However, of direct importance to this paper is the document’s strategy 
to reduce vulnerability in coastal regions and settlements.69 
It compels the three spheres of Australian government to identify vulnerable 
coastal regions and to apply appropriate planning policies, including ensuring the 
availability of land, where possible, for migration of coastal ecosystems.70 The 
development of codes, standards and guides for planning systems are also seen as 
essential to increase the resilience of human settlements to climate change. This 
involves the revision of standards used for building, plumbing, electrical standards 
and specification for the development and subdivision of land, as well as the 
reviewing of stormwater and sewerage guidelines. The information used to 
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determine vulnerability of settlements to climate-related hazards must also be 
revisited to ensure that climate change is taken into account.71 
Planning, however, lies at the heart of the state governments’ responsibilities.72 
Policies dealing with climate change adaptation are thus conceivably more 
comprehensive at state level. And there is no paucity of climate change adaptation 
documents in the Queensland Government’s archives.  McDonald73 points out that 
some documents are broad statements of policy, such as the ClimateSmart 
Adaptation: 2007-2012;74 and that others are specific legislative instruments, such 
as the Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld), the State Coastal 
Management Plan and some State Planning Policies. 
The ClimateSmart Adaptation strategy addresses adaptation issues and is 
formulated mostly along the lines of the National Climate Change Adaptation 
Framework. Like its Federal counterpart, it requires government authorities at both 
state and municipal level to take action to reduce vulnerability, enhance 
institutional resilience and to form the basis for future adaptation planning.75 
However, it goes further in that it requires local government to integrate climate 
change considerations into environmental impact assessments and to prepare a 
Local Government Climate Change Management Strategy (including maps 
identifying the areas most at risk to storm tides). It also contains a statement that 
climate change impacts must be factored into future regional planning, the State 
Government Climate Change Management Strategy and the Urban Drainage 
Manual and that the existing planning tools must be reviewed.76 
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3.2.2 Relevant statutes and ‘statutory instruments’ 
Queensland’s Sustainable Planning Act77 (SPA) plays an integral role in our 
understanding of how the more specific Queensland adaptation policies influence 
planning in this state. The stated purpose of the SPA is to ensure ecological 
sustainability by ‘...managing the process by which development occurs; and 
managing the effects of the development on the environment...’78 In advancing the 
purpose of the Act, role players are required to ensure that decision-making 
processes take into account the short and long-term effects of development at 
local, regional, State and wider levels including ‘for example, the effects of climate 
change.’79 This explicit reference to climate change at the outset makes it clear that 
climate change adaptation shall be a chief consideration for future development. 
Decisions are also required to incorporate the notions of good governance,80 the 
precautionary principle81 and intergenerational equity82 into the decision-making 
process. The meaning and importance of the precautionary principle and the 
intergenerational equity principle in climate change adaptation has already been 
mentioned.83 Moreover, it will be recalled that integrating climate change 
considerations into planning instruments is an effective way to adapt to climate 
change.84  
‘Development,’85 for the purposes of this Act, includes carrying out building work;86 
reconfiguring87 a lot;88 carrying out operational work;89 carrying out plumbing and 
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drainage work and making a material change of use90 of premises. Any 
‘development’ so defined can disturb the soil in the coastal zone or increase coastal 
population density and therefore place people and property at risk from the effects 
of climate change. Conversely, if the plumbing and drainage dimension of 
‘development’ is managed effectively, the effects of severe water-related coastal 
hazards can be avoided or mitigated.  
The Act also makes provision for the establishment of certain planning instruments 
and an integrated development assessment system (IDAS) to achieve ecologically 
sustainable development. Planning instruments influence future planning decisions, 
such as coastal development and coastal management measures, which may impact 
directly on the vulnerability of the Queensland coast to climate change. The IDAS, 
on the other hand, is an informative measure that aims to provide relevant 
information, such as the predicted effects of climate change, to decision-makers in 
order to place the latter in a position to make socially and environmentally 
desirable development decisions impacting on the coastal zone. These aspects of 
the Act therefore warrant a rapid appraisal. 
In order to understand the SPA’s planning instruments, the IDAS needs to be 
discussed first. IDAS is the system for ‘integrating state and local government 
assessment and approval processes for development.’91 All development under the 
Act is ‘exempt development’ unless it is assessable development, self-assessable 
development, prohibited development or development requiring compliance 
assessment.92 Planning schemes and related planning instruments under the Act 
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specify the type of development that is development requiring compliance 
assessment, self-assessable or assessable development (requiring code or impact 
assessment or both code and impact assessment) development .93 Those planning 
instruments and policies both useful and relevant to climate change adaptation will 
be looked at below.94 A development permit is necessary for assessable 
development,95 whereas such a permit is not required for self-assessable 
development,96 exempt development97 or development requiring compliance 
assessment.98 Self-assessable development, however, must comply with the 
relevant codes set out in various instruments and regulations99 and a compliance 
permit is necessary for development requiring compliance assessment.100 For 
prohibited development, on the other hand, an application or request for 
compliance assessment may not be made.101 
A development permit authorises development to the extent stated in the 
permit.102 From a climate change adaption point of view, it would be desirable for 
coastal development to always require a development permit. Development 
permits can also be subject to a condition prescribed by the assessment manager of 
a particular development, the concurrency agency for a particular development, the 
Minister or another Act.103 Conditions relating to the resilience of coastal buildings 
to the effects of climate change, for example, can be prescribed by the various role 
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players or another Act, such as the Coastal Protection and Management Act,104 
which will be outlined below. 
The assessment manager is the authority responsible for managing and deciding the 
success of an application for a development permit.105 However, an assessment 
manager will not always assess an application in its entirety; there are 
circumstances under which a ‘concurrence agency’ is to be appointed to assist in 
administering and managing the application.106 Moreover, certain responsibilities 
can also be delegated to an ‘advice agency’ under section 250 of the Act. Lastly, 
assessment managers and referral agencies107 can seek advice or comment from 
third parties about applications.108 The identity of the competent authority 
responsible for development assessments can be crucial to whether climate change 
adaption takes place or not. The Act provides a myriad of opportunities under which 
a climate change specialist can become part of the development application 
process. One such example, springing from the Coastal Protection and Management 
Act109 will be explored below. 
The SPA planning regime is a comprehensive one that makes provision for planning 
instruments at state, regional and local level. Local planning instruments include 
planning schemes, temporary local planning instruments and planning scheme 
policies. Planning schemes are the most important planning instruments at this 
level. They are statutory instruments110 created by each local government111 in the 
state to provide for an integrated planning policy for the local government’s 
planning scheme area.112 They may include planning scheme policies and structure 
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plans.113 One of the core matters of planning schemes is ‘land use and 
development,’ which includes the effects of land use and development.114 
Therefore, local governments must be aware of the future effects of allowing 
development and activities close to sections of the coastal zone predicted to be 
affected by climate change in the long-run. If planning schemes aim to adapt to 
climate change, they must ensure that the coastal zone is to be kept clear of 
development and environmentally deleterious activities in order to protect people 
and property from storm surges and sea-level rise. 
When the Minister is satisfied that there are signs of risk of significant 
environmental harm in a planning scheme area, he or she may direct the local 
government to make a temporary local planning instrument115 that will have the 
effect of suspending the relevant planning scheme for up to a year.116 They must be 
designed to protect planning scheme areas from adverse impacts.117 The 
requirements and contents of these plans are similar to planning schemes.118 The 
term ‘adverse impacts’ may well be interpreted to include ‘climate change impacts.’ 
A Minister may find that a particular planning scheme is inadequate in dealing with 
the projected impacts of climate change and consequently direct a temporary 
planning scheme until the relevant planning scheme has been amended to provide 
for climate change adaptation.  
Finally, in order to avoid the use of temporary planning schemes, a local authority 
may prepare planning scheme policies that support the local government actions 
for making and amending planning schemes before releasing its planning 
scheme.119 These policies can also support the local dimension of a planning 
scheme120 and support local government actions under the SPA for IDAS.121 It may 
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include information local governments may require for development applications, 
standards identified in a code and guidelines or advice about satisfying criteria in 
planning schemes.122 Although these documents are mere guidelines for local 
authorities when undertaking action under this Act, they can be of use in 
jurisdictions projected to be significantly affected by sea-level rise and related 
coastal hazards, such as Brisbane and Cairns. They may well state the type of 
development or design that will be inimical to climate change adaptation.    
State planning instruments, on the other hand, include state planning regulatory 
provisions, regional plans, state planning policies and standard planning scheme 
provisions.123 State regulatory provisions form the backbone of the state planning 
system. They are afforded statutory instrument status under the Statutory 
Instruments Act124 and prevail over all other planning instruments in the Act and in 
other Acts.125 They advance the purposes of the Act by providing regulatory support 
for regional planning or master planning in the state.126 Significantly also they aim 
to protect planning scheme areas from adverse impacts.127 ‘Adverse impacts’ are 
not defined and there is thus space to argue that climate-related damage owing to 
sea-level rise and coastal inundation fall within this definition, especially since 
climate change adaptation is an objective of the Act. The Minister is required to 
make these provisions if she or he is satisfied that there is a sign of risk of serious 
environmental harm.128 Low-lying densely populated coastal areas are submitted to 
fall within this definition. A Minister will do well to set minimum planning 
requirements for such areas to guard against future climate-related coastal 
hazards.129  
                                                          
122
 SPA Sec 114 
123
 SPA Sec 15 
124
 Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld) It is also explicitly stated that state planning regulatory 
provisions are not subordinate legislation. 
125
 SPA Sec 17-18 
126
 SPA Sec 16(1)(a) 
127
 SPA Sec 16(1)(b) 
128
 SPA Sec 19 
129
 SPA Sec 21 sets out the content of the plan. Other than the requirement for it to make provisions 












Whereas state planning provisions apply in the state as a whole, regional plans 
apply only in ‘designated regions’130 and to Queensland waters adjacent to local 
government areas/parts.131 Regional plans are statutory instruments132 that contain 
regional planning policies. The key elements of regional plans are outcomes for the 
region and policies and actions necessary for achieving these outcomes. They also 
set out the desired future spatial structure, including the future regional land use 
pattern.133 Climate change adaption may well be a desired outcome for coastal 
regions and the latter can be planned so that development does not take place too 
close to the coastal zone, which would place it at risk of future climate change.  
Standard planning scheme provisions create a consistent structure for planning 
schemes and may contain standard provisions for implementing integrated planning 
at local level.134 Local governments are required to amend their planning schemes 
to reflect standard planning scheme provisions.135 These instruments can be a 
useful mechanism to require coastal jurisdictions to make provision for climate 
change adaption in the coastal zone to protect people and property. However, they 
are by their very nature general provisions and will most likely not require local 
authorities to insert into planning schemes adaptation outcomes and measures 
relevant to the unique climate change challenges that it will face in the future.  
State planning policies advance the purpose of the Act by stating the state’s policy 
about a matter of state interest. Climate change adaptation is a matter of state 
interest as state planning policies relating directly and indirectly to this topic 
currently apply in the state.136 They are made by the Minister responsible for the 
matter137 and are also stated to be statutory instruments138 and therefore must be 
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taken into account when development decisions are made. State planning policies 
are also temporary planning instruments as they are only valid for a maximum of 10 
years.139  
The SPA policies and policies sprouting from other acts addressing climate change 
adaptation and those which have a direct bearing on the planning system devised in 
the SPA are the State Planning Policy 1/03: Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of Flood, 
Bushfire and Landslide (SPP 1/03),140 the Coastal Protection and Management Act 
1995, the State Coastal Management Plan (SCMP)141 and the various Regional 
Coastal Management Plans (RCMP).142 Certain guidelines to these documents are 
also useful in this quest for ascertaining the content and strength of climate change 
adaptation policy in Queensland, including ‘Mitigating the Adverse Impacts on 
Stormtide Inundation Guidelines’143 (Stormtide Guidelines) issued under the SCMP 
and the Urban Drainage Manual144 issued under the COAG’s National Framework. 
Floods, in particular, are dealt with by SPP 1/03. The stated purpose of this 
document is to ensure that floods and landslides, inter alia,145 are adequately 
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considered when making decisions about development.146 It applies in all declared 
‘natural hazard areas’ throughout Queensland. With regard to floods, all instances 
of material changes of use or associated reconfigurations of a lot that increase the 
number of people living or working in the natural hazard management area, involve 
institutional uses where evacuating people may be particularly difficult, involve the 
manufacture or storage of hazardous materials in bulk or involve described147 
building work148 are covered by policy. ‘Natural hazard areas’ may therefore be 
expanded by local authorities if there is scientific evidence of more severe and far-
reaching future climate-related floods in its jurisdiction. One can certainly envisage 
such an expansion since the policy places floods in the climate change context. It 
talks of the importance of taking future changes to natural hazards into account 
when undertaking natural hazard assessments and developing natural hazard 
mitigation strategies.149 It also makes explicit reference to the predicted effects of 
climate change that may impact on the severity and rate of recurrence of future 
floods and landslides in the Queensland Greenhouse Policy Framework.150 Such an 
approach is submitted to be consistent with the precautionary principle.  
Once ‘natural hazard management areas’ are declared,151 local authorities must 
ensure that they are reflected and considered in planning schemes and 
development assessment. According to the SPP1/03, natural hazard management 
areas must be identified in planning schemes.152 Natural hazard areas revised to 
accommodate for the changes in future flood affected areas can thus significantly 
influence planning schemes. Strategies for dealing with natural hazards in natural 
hazard areas are also required to be compatible with the ‘nature of the hazard,’ and 
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seek to minimise the adverse impacts of floods on existing developed areas and 
prevent development from materially increasing the extent or the severity of 
floods.153 Strategies must therefore be ‘compatible’ with more severe future floods 
and accompanying landslides attributable to global warming. Existing development 
can accordingly be made more resilient to floods and future development 
exacerbating the effects of floods may be prohibited in coastal regions that will be 
vulnerable to future floods.  
The SPP1/03 also requires that codes applicable to assessable and self-assessable 
development in natural hazard areas are aimed at achieving the above outcomes.154 
Similarly, development assessment within natural hazard management areas must 
be compatible with the nature of the natural hazard. If compatibility is impossible or 
undesirable for whatever reason, it must be ensured that assessable development 
occurs in such a way as to minimise, as far as practicable, the adverse effects of 
natural hazards so that the floods do not result in an unacceptable risk to people or 
property.155 Assessment managers may therefore grant development assessments 
on the condition156 that the relevant development is resilient enough to withstand 
more severe future floods if avoiding development in areas that will be affected by 
future floods is not viable or desirable.   
The CPMA, the SCMP and the various regional pans, on the other hand, are hailed 
as the chief documents addressing stormtide inundation and sea level rise. The 
CPMA itself does not directly address climate change adaptation, but is potentially a 
useful tool in Queensland’s adaptation efforts. It defines Queensland’s ‘coastal 
zone’ as coastal waters; or all areas to the landward side of coastal waters in which 
there are physical features, ecological or natural processes or human activities that 
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affect, or potentially affect, the coast or coastal resources.’157 If the latter is absent, 
the landward side of the coastal zone ends at the ‘highest astronomical tide.’158 The 
seaward boundary, the end of Queensland waters, is found 3 nautical miles from 
the high water mark out to sea.159 Land in the coastal zone is capable of private 
ownership, with the exception of coastal management districts. 
Coastal management districts, also called ‘state coastal land,’160 are subject to 
unique regulatory and enforcement mechanisms. Coastal management districts can 
be declared by the Minister,161 having regard to, inter alia, the ecological sensitivity 
and characteristics of the region, the economic productivity of the region and any 
interests held in land and development and planning in the region.162 Sections of 
the coastal zone that are predicted to be severely affected by climate change in the 
future may well be declared coastal management districts in order to place them 
under strict state control, making state-led adaptation easier. The Act further 
empowers the Minister to declare building lines in coastal management districts, 
prohibiting or restricting development on the seaward side of building lines.163 They 
are thus important tools for expanding coastal management districts as an 
adaptation measure to guard against future sea-level rise and stormtide inundation.   
The SPA’s IDAS applies slightly differently in coastal management districts. It sets 
out specific considerations the competent authorities must take into account when 
considering an assessable development application,164 such as the unique 
characteristics of the coastal zone and public access to the foreshore. Sea-level rise 
and coastal inundation can possibly be classified as ‘unique characteristics’ of the 
coastal zone and therefore impact on development assessments. Furthermore, for a 
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development application in the coastal management district, the Chief Executive of 
the Environmental Protection Agency will act as either the assessment manager (if 
the Council’s165 approval is not necessary) or as the concurrence agency, a position 
marked by the power to veto an approval or to require conditions, but without the 
vires to consider aesthetic factors.166 This innovative institutional rearrangement 
allows an environmental specialist, possibly one with knowledge of the predicted 
effects of climate change on the region, to play a role in assessing the viability of 
coastal development. Furthermore, it makes provision for specific conditions that 
can be attached to assessable development authorisations in order to ensure that 
the impact on the coastal zone is kept to a minimum.167 One such condition may 
very well be that any building is made resilient to future coastal floods and storm 
tide inundation. Furthermore, compliance with these conditions may be secured by 
requesting the holder of the authorisation to lodge financial security with the chief 
executive, which will only be returnable upon fulfilment of the conditions.168 This is 
submitted to be an effective way to ensure the long-term effectiveness of climate 
change adaptation initiatives.   
The CPMA’s derivative instruments, the SCMP169 and the various RCMPs make more 
direct reference to climate change and climate change adaptation.170 These plans 
are also ‘Statutory Instruments’ under the Statutory Instruments Act 1997 and 
therefore need to be taken into account when making decisions regarding the 
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management of the Queensland or regional coast.171 The CPMA also affords these 
plans the status of State Planning Policy172 under the SPA.  
The SCMP’s principles on coastal use and development are for all practical reasons 
the same as those adopted in the IPA,173 although specific to the management of 
the coastal regions. Significantly, it prohibits the growth of urban settlements in 
areas identified to have or have the potential to have unacceptable risk from 
coastal hazards.174 These hazards are identified as stormtides, cyclone effects and 
related inundation. The exact positioning of these areas must be based on the 
mapping of stormtide hazards as well as considering the impact of physical coastal 
process, including any impacts from sea-level rise. Where these areas have already 
been developed, further development in these areas must address the vulnerability 
to sea-level rise and stormtide inundation and the proposed access to and 
protection of evacuation routes.175 Another coastal management outcome for this 
plan is to ensure that the ‘coast is managed to allow for natural fluctuations to 
occur, including any that occur as a result of climate change and sea level rise, and 
provide protection for life and property.’176 In order to achieve this outcome, the 
principle that ‘trends in climate change including sea level rise, more extensive 
stormtide flooding and associated potential impacts are taken into account in the 
planning process.’177 More specifically, a hierarchy of approaches is created178 to 
fulfil this climate change adaptation directive: 
 ‘[A]void – focus on locating new developments in areas not vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change; 
 planned retreat – focus on systematic abandonment of land, ecosystems and 
structures in vulnerable areas; 
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 accommodate – focus on continued occupation of near-coastal areas but with 
adjustments such as altered building design; and 
 protect – focus on the defence of vulnerable areas, populations centres, economic 
activities and coastal resources.’ 
The South-East Queensland Regional Coastal Management Plan (SEQRCMP)179 does 
not contain a specific climate change adaptation policy. Instead it refers the reader 
to its policy directives on erosion prone areas and the SCMP’s climate change 
adaptation directive. However, a related policy document, the South-East 
Queensland Regional Plan,180 states that land in this region that is not already 
subject to a development commitment must take into account sea level rise of at 
least 0.8 meters; and land that is already subject to a development commitment 
must accommodate for a gradually rising sea level.181 The Wet Tropical Coast 
Regional Coastal Management Plan (WTCRCMP) does not identify areas particularly 
at risk from climate change either. Only broad statements are made that 
development agencies must incorporate available data into development decisions 
and must make a concerted effort to enhance knowledge of the future effects of 
climate change in the region.182 
3.3 South African adaptation regime 
3.3.1 Relevant policies 
The South African government has released several policies indirectly relevant to 
and dealing explicitly with climate change adaptation.183 The National Framework 
for Sustainable Development in South Africa184 (NFSD) falls into the former 
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category. It serves to prescribe how the concept of sustainable development is to 
be understood and applied in South Africa.185 According to the policy, sustainable 
development in a developing country such as South Africa means economic growth, 
but within ecological thresholds.186 A ‘zero growth’ strategy’ as proposed by 
developed countries is stated to be undesirable in the developing country 
framework.187 In addition, the challenge of meeting fundamental human rights 
needs, further compounds the notion of sustainable development in South Africa.188 
It also identifies more specific challenges and constraints. The pertinent ones 
include ‘the need for settlements that are spatially integrated and create safe and 
healthy living environments,’189 ‘the need for a more integrated approach to land 
use and development’190 and ‘the need for improved integration of environmental 
considerations into Integrated Development Plans and Spatial Development 
Frameworks.’191  
It seeks to address the above challenges by, inter alia, creating sustainable human 
settlements by ensuring that the design of urban infrastructure takes into account 
sustainability design criteria;192 and integrating environmental considerations into 
sectoral policy and activities as well as spatial planning devices.193 Climate change is 
also regarded by the policy to be a cross-cutting developmental and environmental 
challenge. However, it does not specify that the South African coast needs to be 
protected from future sea-level rise and coastal storm inundation.194 Instead it 
identifies sea-level rise as a threat for densely populated, low-lying coastal areas in 
Africa. Adaptation costs in this regard are projected to be as much as 5-10% of an 
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African nation’s GDP.195 It then also refers the reader to the National Climate 
Change Response Strategy for South Africa or the NCCRS.196  
The NCCRS emphasizes that South Africa’s international climate change obligations 
must be fulfilled in a manner consistent with other government policies and 
national priorities. Other government policies envisaged here may be the 
overarching Reconstruction and Development Programme that aims to accelerate 
the provision of services to poor households within a broad sustainability 
framework.197 A relevant national priority in this regard may well be poverty 
alleviation. As far as climate change adaptation is concerned, the chief objective is 
to ‘offset South Africa’s vulnerability to climate change.’198 Although coastal 
management is listed as a climate change adaptation issue on an international 
scale, it is not listed as a climate change adaptation priority for South Africa. It 
however provides that the increased incidences and severity of future floods must 
be addressed by incorporating relevant adaptation measures into the National 
Disaster Management Act199 and by ongoing monitoring and forecasting as well as 
establishing new baselines and improving the resilience of buildings to floods.200 To 
the end of climate change adaptation it prescribes the development of existing 
statutory instruments and policies to address climate change, albeit by means of 
broad adaptation objectives instead of specific adaptation principles and 
methods.201  
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The White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa202 is 
particularly pertinent to this dissertation. It is South Africa’s framework policy for 
integrated coastal management that purports to ensure sustainable coastal 
development that involves a balance between material prosperity, social 
development, cultural values, spiritual fulfilment and ecological integrity, in the 
interest of all South Africans.203 The policy statements relevant to the dissertation 
are found under the theme of ‘coastal planning and development.’ The policy 
purports to, inter alia, make provisions to ‘plan and manage coastal development so 
as to avoid increasing incidence and severity of natural hazards and to avoid 
exposure of people, property and economic activities to significant risk from 
dynamic coastal processes’ and to take into account the ‘potential consequences 
medium- and long-term climate change and associated sea level rise... in all coastal 
planning and management.’204  
Various measures are enumerated in fulfilment of the first goal. Firstly, the 
biophysical features of the coast must act as a natural buffer against coastal hazards 
and therefore as a ‘development set-back.’ Secondly, the areas subject to high 
energy coastal processes must be identified and managed. Thirdly, inappropriately 
located structures must be relocated and removed where possible. Fourthly, 
restoration and/or extensions of structures in hazardous coastal areas will be 
discouraged. And lastly, the precautionary, risk averse approach will guide decision-
making, especially in dynamic and high risk areas.205 Government seeks to achieve  
the second goal by making provision for appropriate preventative and adaptive 
measures in all coastal planning and management decisions and actions. Attention 
will specifically be paid to the potential impact of sea level rise on low-lying, densely 
populated areas of the coast. And to this end, special consideration will be given to 
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coastal infrastructure such as beachfront buildings as well as adequate monitoring 
and public awareness about possible implications of climate change.206    
The most comprehensive account of climate change adaptation at local level is the 
City of Cape Town’s Framework for Adaptation to Climate Change,207 released in 
2006. However, the document does not have binding force and merely makes 
reference to the effect of climate change on the Western Cape and contains a series 
of recommendations for action by local government208 and case studies on the 
projected effects of climate change at certain geographical locations within the 
municipal area and the projected costs of related damages annually.209  
3.3.2 Relevant statutes 
A discussion on the environmental statutory measures must necessarily start with 
the constitutionally enshrined environmental right. The environmental right is 
found in section 24 of the Constitution and reads as follows: 
‘Everyone has the right – 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that – 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
Subsection (a), or ‘the environmental right’ is of particular importance to the 
common law since it applies horizontally, or between natural and juristic persons, 
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as envisaged by section 8(2) of the Constitution.210 The law that regulates matters 
between individuals, such as the law of delict can thus potentially be affected by 
this important subsection.211 The ambit of the environmental right is exceptionally 
wide from a number of perspectives. Firstly, it is afforded to ‘everyone,’ thus having 
a potentially wide range of litigants.212 Secondly, the meaning of environment, as 
set out in the Act that gives effect to section 24, the National Environmental 
Management Act or NEMA,213 defines ‘environment’ to include both the natural 
and human environment. Lastly, the terms ‘health’ and ‘well-being’ can arguably 
also be interpreted to have wide reaching implications. ‘Health’ is not a foreign 
concept to South African law, since the right to health has always been recognised 
under the law of nuisance. A land use that is proved to objectively affect another’s 
health will be found to be a nuisance.214 The constitutional concept of ‘health’ is 
similarly objectively ascertainable with reference to a minimum standard, such as 
the one preferred by the World Health Organisation, ‘state of complete physical, 
mental and physical well-being.’215 ‘Well-being’ on the other hand is an open-ended 
notion and cannot be defined precisely.216 The meaning of this word can 
conceivably be relative to the personality of the person seeking to enforce the right 
and would have to be determined in the light of the facts before the court.217 In 
Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts 
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Products and Others,218 the applicant’s ‘well-being’ was found to be infringed by the 
respondent’s contamination of the air with hydrogen sulphide, thereby creating an 
‘environment of stench.’ The insertion of ‘well-being’ is welcomed not only because 
it raises the minimum standard of environmental quality to which ‘everyone’ should 
be exposed, but also because it may entail a sense of environmental integrity. It is 
argued that the net cast by ‘well-being’ is wide enough to capture issues such as the 
conservation of fauna and flora, the maintenance of biodiversity219 and proper 
planning in the urban environment.220 Some even go as far as submitting that it 
includes notions of ethics and spiritual dimension of the natural environment.221  
The importance and influence of the environmental right, often underestimated,222 
was pointed out in the oft quoted statement of Olivier JA in Director: Mineral 
Development, Gauteng Region, and Another v Save the Vaal Environment and 
Others:223  
‘Our Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental, justiciable human 
rights, by necessary implication requires that environmental considerations be accorded 
recognition and respect in the administrative processes in our country. Together with the 
change in the ideological climate must also come a change in our legal and administrative 
approach to environmental concerns.’ [own emphasis] 
The National Environmental Management Act224 or NEMA, in effect an extension of 
Section 24 of the Constitution, enjoys the status of ‘Constitutional Legislation’ The 
NEMA’s interpretation and operation is ruled by certain principles. Following the 
international trend, the central theme of NEMA’s Section 2 principles is ‘sustainable 
development’ and two integral aspects of this philosophy, namely that a risk-averse 
and cautious approach is applied, which takes into account the limits of current 
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knowledge about the consequences of decisions and actions;225’ and that ‘negative 
impacts on the environment and on people’s environmental rights are anticipated 
and prevented, and where they cannot be altogether prevented, are minimised and 
remedied’226 are among the principles of the Act. The Act therefore encourages 
prospective action to be taken by government to guard against future 
environmental risks, such as climate change. Cognisance must also be taken of the 
government’s trusteeship over the environment227 and the fact that ‘global and 
international responsibilities’ must be discharged in the national interest.228 In 
addition, it is also significant that  
‘Sensitive, vulnerable, highly dynamic and stressed ecosystems, such as coastal 
shore, estuaries, wetlands and similar systems require specific attention in 
management and planning procedures, especially where they are subject to 
significant human resource usage and development pressure.’229 
The importance of coastal management must accordingly influence all human 
activities that have an impact on the environment in the coastal zone. It will be 
recalled that planning for and adapting to climate change constitutes an integral 
aspect of coastal management under the White Paper for Sustainable Coastal 
Development.230 
There is plenty of scope for arguing that the planning framework in South Africa sits 
comfortably with implementing planning-related climate change adaptation 
measures. Firstly, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act231 or LGMSA makes 
provision for the chief development and planning instrument,232 the Integrated 
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Development Plan or IDP.233 Each municipality in South Africa is to adopt this 
‘single, inclusive and strategic plan’ for the development of the municipality.234 IDPs 
must contain a long-term vision of the development of a municipality.235 This 
includes an assessment of the existing level of development in a municipality’s area 
of jurisdiction;236 development priorities and objectives;237 a spatial development 
framework;238 applicable disaster management plans;239 key performance indicators 
and performance targets;240 and operational strategies.241 Its strategies are to be 
aligned with other legislation and policy.242 IDPs of coastal jurisdictions therefore 
can potentially include climate change adaptation as a priority and objective and as 
an operational strategy to address the potential effects of climate change on 
beachfront property. Disaster management plans can furthermore be adapted to 
account for climate change. Spatial development frameworks can furthermore 
indicate climate change risk areas where development must be restricted or 
prohibited. 
IDPs guides and informs all planning and development in a municipality’s area of 
jurisdiction and must influence all decisions with regard to planning, management 
and development in a municipality.243 It binds the municipality in the exercise of its 
powers and duties except to the extent of any inconsistency between a 
municipality’s IDP and national or provincial legislation, in which case such 
legislation prevails.244 It is therefore insubordinate to statutory instruments, such as 
NEMA but prevails over other policies and regulations, such as zoning schemes and 
structure plans. 
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One such statutory instrument is the National Environmental Management: 
Integrated Coastal Management Act (NEMICMA),245 legislation that stems from the 
White Paper on Sustainable Coastal Development. This Act is useful for the 
mitigation of the effects of climate change as it aims to create a coordinated and 
integrated management system for the South African coast by placing the coastal 
zone in the state’s care.246 The NEMICMA defines the coastal zone247 as the area 
stretching from the highwater mark248 to the end of the South African exclusive 
economic zone.249 The coastal zone is made up of several distinct components, 
most importantly, coastal public property, the coastal protection zone, coastal 
access land and coastal protected areas.250 Certain rules and regulations apply 
throughout the coastal zone whilst others apply only uniquely to a single 
component of the coastal zone. 
The most direct reference to climate change in the Act is found in the section 
dealing with determining the boundaries of coastal areas.251 When determining the 
inland coastal boundary of coastal public property,252 the Minister must take into 
account, amongst other factors, ‘the potential effects of the projected rises in sea-
level.’253 Moreover, an MEC determining the inland boundary of the coastal 
protection zone254 must consider, inter alia, ‘the need to avoid risks posed by 
natural hazards to people, biodiversity, coastal public property;’255 and ‘the 
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potential for the number and severity of natural disasters to increase due to the 
effects of global climate change and other impacts on the environment, and the 
importance of taking preventative measures to prevent these threats.’256 It is clear 
that the establishment of these pivotal components of the coastal zone must be 
influenced by climate change projections. Integrating climate change knowledge 
into planning mechanisms is an effective adaptation method.    
Another useful measure that potentially applies in the coastal zone is establishment 
of set-back lines. The basis for establishing such a line can, inter alia, be the 
protection of the coastal public property, private property and public safety.257 It 
may prohibit or restrict the building, erection, alteration or extension of structures 
that are seaward of the line.258 Significantly, set-back lines may be situated outside 
of the coastal zone.259 A coastal set-back line must appear on the map of a relevant 
municipality’s zoning scheme.260 An MEC may well use available climate change 
predictions to inform the establishment of a set-back line in a low-lying area that 
will potentially be affected by sea level rise and coastal inundation to discourage or 
prohibit future development seaward of the line (especially where the inland 
boundary of the coastal zone proves inadequate to protect people and property 
from sea-level rise and related future disasters).   
NEMICMA does not prescribe a management regime for the coastal zone; instead it 
makes provision for the drawing up of coastal management programmes on 
national,261 provincial262 and municipal263 level by the Minister, the MEC and the 
municipal council respectively within four years of the Act coming into force.264 
They must contain a vision for the management of the coastal zone, contain coastal 
                                                          
256
 NEMICMA Sec 28(3)(d) 
257
 NEMICMA Sec 25(1)(a)(i) 
258
 NEMICMA Sec 25(1)(b) 
259
 NEMICMA Sec 25(4) 
260
 NEMICMA Sec 25(3) Zoning schemes will be discussed below. 
261
NEMICMA sec 44 
262
 NEMICMA sec 46 
263
 NEMICMA sec 48 This Section provides that the plans at this level may be adopted as part of the 
relevant municipality’s IDP. 
264












management objectives, norms and standards; strategies aimed at achieving these 
objectives; and performance indicators to measure whether the objectives are 
being met. 265 These plans may well thus include climate change adaptation as an 
objective and hence contain adaptation strategies, specific to the area in which it 
applies, modelled on those discussed in Chapter 2 above. Coastal management 
plans can potentially also contain standards relating to adaptation measures that 
must be upheld in the event of the coast being planned or developed. However, 
Coastal management plans are afforded the status of ‘policy directives.’266 They are 
consequently not binding on planning authorities, but mere guidelines.  
The NEMICMA’s Coastal planning schemes, on the other hand, have a binding 
status. A coastal planning scheme is a scheme that facilitates the attainment of 
coastal management objectives by defining within the coastal zone or coastal 
management zone, which may be used exclusively for specified purposes or 
activities, or may not be used for specified purposes or activities;267 and by 
prohibiting or restricting uses of areas that do not comply with the rules of the 
scheme.268 A municipality may not adopt a planning scheme that is inconsistent 
with a coastal planning scheme.269 Activities that may place people or property in 
the way of sea-level rise or coastal inundation may thus be restricted or prohibited 
by the adoption of such a scheme, providing climate change adaptation is made a 
coastal management objective. A municipality’s planning instruments, such as its 
IDP and its zoni g schemes, will accordingly be affected.  
Provision for zoning is made in provincial planning legislation. The Cape Land Use 
Planning Ordinance (or LUPO)270 for example, which applies in the provinces of the 
Northern Cape, the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape, makes provision for 
structure plans and zoning schemes. Structure plans are guidelines for future spatial 
planning of the area to which it relates (including urban renewal, urban design and 
                                                          
265
 NEMICMA Sec 45, 47 and 49 
266
 NEMICMA Sec 45, 47, 49 
267
 NEMICMA Sec 56(1)(a) 
268
 NEMICMA Sec 56(1)(b) 
269
 NEMICMA Sec 57(2)(b) 
270












the preparation of development plans) as well as the general welfare of the 
community concerned.271 They do not confer or take away any rights in relation to 
land,272 but they may authorise zoning in accordance with such structure plan.273 A 
structure plan can thus, for instance, potentially guide urban renewal and urban 
design programmes at municipal level to require that buildings are made resilient to 
the future effects of climate change; or that development in densely populated low-
lying areas is restricted or prohibited in order to  minimise exposure of people and 
property to sea-level rise and coastal inundation. 
Zoning schemes on the other hand are drawn up by a municipal council to 
determine use rights and to provide for control over use rights and over the 
utilisation of land in the area of jurisdiction of a local authority.274 The Draft City of 
Cape Town Zoning Scheme,275 for example makes provision for areas to be zoned 
‘open space zones.’ Under this zoning category, ‘environmental conservation 
zones,’276 which have the purpose of conserving environmental resources, are 
particularly useful for climate change adaptation planning. In Chapter Two it was 
said that proper management of coastal ecosystems is an effective adaptation 
mechanism. The zoning scheme document also provides for so-called overlay zones 
which can limit land use rights and stipulate more restrictive development rules for 
an area that may encompass more than one base zone. Overlay zones are useful to 
a municipality in that they can give effect to certain planning instruments that 
would be mere guidelines on their own. The use of overlay zones for specific 
management purposes can facilitate climate adaptation in the following ways. An 
environmental management overlay zone277 declared over the coast can provide for 
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the management of special natural and environmental characteristics of the coastal 
area. Low-lying, sandy erosion-prone areas are areas that warrant special 
management mechanisms to guard against the effects of future climate change. 
Zoning scheme documents must also be accompanied by zoning maps that show 
zones and land units in respect of land in its area of jurisdiction.278    
The NEMA and the NEMICMA also provide for mechanisms that can be used to 
protect the coastal environment and its inhabitants from sea-level rise and coastal 
inundation. Firstly, environmental assessments are required for certain activities in 
the coastal zone. The chief provisions for environmental assessments can be found 
in section 24 of NEMA and related documents. The activities that may not 
commence without undergoing an environmental assessment have been identified 
in Government Regulations 386 and 387 of 2006. The list of activities in the former 
can only commence or continue subject to undergoing a basic environmental 
assessment and those activities listed in the latter require a full environmental 
impact assessment before such activities can commence or continue. Basic 
assessment activities relevant to the discussion include ‘the construction of facilities 
or infrastructure...,’ the ‘construction of earth moving activities in the sea or within 
hundred metres inland of the highwater mark of the sea...,’ including disturbing the 
natural vegetation and coastal processes in any way.279 If these activities take place 
on a larger scale, a full environmental impact assessment will be required for it to 
take place.280  
Where environmental authorisations are required for coastal activities, the 
NEMICMA makes it compulsory for the competent authorities, typically the 
Provincial Department in charge of Environmental Affairs,281 to consider, inter alia, 
the likely impact of the proposed activity on the coastal environment, including the 
cumulative effect of its impact together with those of existing activities; and the 
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likely impact of coastal processes on the proposed activity.282 Thus, not only must 
the impact of the proposed development on the coastal zone be taken into account, 
but also the impact of the coastal zone on the proposed development. It has 
already been said that the definition of ‘coastal processes’ must be understood as 
being inclusive of future sea-level rise and climate-related coastal hazards under the 
South African integrated coastal management regime. If such an interpretation is 
accepted, environmental assessments must necessarily contain references to 
climate change if they are to be granted.  
3.4 A comparison between the two adaptation regimes 
One can conclude that the various policies and legislation application in Queensland 
and South Africa lays a good groundwork for taking steps to adapt to future climate 
change. Principles and guidelines of international law climate change adaptation 
documents, such as ecologically sustainable development, the precautionary 
principle and intergenerational equity, also form the basis of both South African and 
Queensland environmental policies and legislation. In Australia the NSESD and the 
IGAE list these principles and guidelines and in South Africa, the Constitution, NEMA 
and the NSSD provide for the consideration of these principles. In both jurisdictions, 
these principles must inform decisions that impact on the environment. Any 
decision impacting on the coastal environment must therefore be taken in a risk-
averse manner and having regard to the well-being of future generations. Scientific 
uncertainty on the impacts of climate change and the delayed nature on climate 
change impacts can therefore not be used as an excuse not to adopt climate change 
policy.    
In both jurisdictions also, policies at national, commonwealth and state level are 
often broad statements of political will to adapt to climate change. Policies such as 
the National Climate Change Adaptation Framework, the Queensland ClimateSmart 
strategy and the South African White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Management 
states that climate change adaptation measures are necessary and that climate 
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change considerations must be integrated into planning decisions impacting on the 
coastal zone. These policies, however, lack in specificity and are only semi-binding. 
They were designed to delegate adaptation responsibility in the coastal zone to 
government at local level, and in the South African situation, to provide the 
skeleton around which legislation may be drafted (the promulgation of the 
NEMICMA following the structure and recommendations of the White Paper for 
Sustainable Coastal Management is a prime example hereof). The adaptation 
policies in Queensland is submitted to be at a more advanced phase than in South 
Africa as certain climate change ‘hotspots’ have already been identified and 
declared in this jurisdiction. 
The Queensland statutory planning regime is both comprehensive and cohesive. All 
relevant planning instruments spring from a single, modern, all-inclusive legislative 
instrument, the SPA. The SPA makes specific reference to climate change and 
climate change adaptation as an issue in modern planning matters at the outset and 
thus sets the tone for the rest of the Act. Planning schemes, the basic planning 
prototype at local level, is influenced by policies and regulations from state level, 
which may well make it obligatory for local governments to adapt to climate 
change. The CPMA, although devoid of any reference to climate change itself, 
makes provision for policies that contain coastal management directives for a state 
that will be affected by climate change. The RCMPs, however, can still be more 
specific about climate change hotspots and specific unique measures that will be 
taken to address the climate change problems in those areas.   
Furthermore, planning instruments, generally are statutory instruments and 
authorities must consequently ‘have regard to’ them in their roles as assessment 
managers and planners. However, concern has been expressed as to the binding 
nature of planning instruments as they were oftentimes undermined in practice 
under the previous Integrated Planning Act283 regime.284 The courts have not been 
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willing to accept responsibility for incorporating climate predictions into the 
planning process either. The Queensland Planning and Environmental Court (QPEC) 
upheld a decision by a local authority to approve development in an area subject to 
inundation at times of severe storm events. The court showed considerable 
deference to the assessment manager in its judgment that such a level of caution is 
neither reasonable nor reasonably required.285 Similarly, in Mackay Conservation 
Group Inc v Mackay City Council,286 the court was unwilling to set aside on review a 
decision to approve development despite the municipal council’s decision to ignore 
a caveat from the Queensland Department of Resources and Mines that the 
development will be in danger of being damaged by a 1-in-500 year inundation 
event.287 McDonald288 believes that such a deferential approach is questionable in 
the light the scientific strength of climate predictions. 
By contrast, the South African statutory planning regime is more fragmentary. 
Planning instruments can be found in national, provincial and local legislation. 
Perhaps, however, this could be expected for a much larger and complex 
jurisdiction. The NEMICMA is crucial for influencing planning instruments to include 
climate change adaptation measures for the coastal zone. It is the only planning-
related statutory instrument that makes direct reference to climate change (albeit 
only with regards to the establishment of the boundaries of the coastal zone) and if 
viewed against the background of its underlying policy, the White Paper for 
Sustainable Coastal Management, contains various planning and regulatory 
instruments useful to support South Africa’s climate change adaptation efforts. 
The binding nature of climate change statutes and policies in South Africa is also a 
moot point. The South African courts have emphasized the significant burden 
already carried by the government in its quest to provide poor communities with 
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socio-economic services in accordance with the Constitution and the problem of the 
polycentricity in socio-economic rights litigation.289 The same can be said of future 
climate-related hazards. As stated above, significant funds will have to be made 
available for adaptation in a developing country such as South Africa that host a 
large number of people that will be vulnerable to climate change effects. 
Furthermore, it is not certain whether South African authorities, especially at local 
government level, will have the necessary skill or capacity to implement climate 
change measures in the coastal zone.      
An unambiguous duty in statutory law for governments to adapt to climate change 
can thus not be said to exist in either jurisdiction. Some might call the inability of 
the law to establish a clear duty a ‘policy gap.’290 The climate change policy lacuna 
in both jurisdictions, however, does not necessarily mean that there is no duty on 
these governments to adapt to climate change. The ancient bodies of common law 
doctrines in either jurisdiction is yet to be explored and it may be revealed that 
these sets of rules are capable of coercing governments to adapt to climate change. 
The doctrines of tort and delict are of particular import for the purposes of this 
dissertation. It will, however, be appropriate to firstly say something about the 
usefulness and relevance of the common law, and in particular tort and delict, in 
environmental matters before the intricacies of the two bodies of common law are 
explored in more detail. 
4. The relevance of the common law for climate change adaptation 
4.1 The role of the common law in the environmental context 
4.1.1 Limitations of the statutory frameworks 
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Courts have been content to defer to the legislature and the executive and their 
law-making powers, especially regarding environmental issues.291 Instead, public 
regulation or the ‘command and control’ approach292 is often hailed as the panacea 
for environmental problems, from pollution to ecologically unfriendly land use 
practices.293 Yet, in its pre-eminence over the last few decades, various flaws and 
anomalies have been exposed in the so-called ‘stick’ approach. Murphy294 points 
out that policies and legislation do not always make sufficient provision for 
measures that ensure the effective enforcement of its aims and objectives. Vague 
definitions resulting from poor draftsmanship may also lead to anomalous 
situations in which responsibility is not attributed for environmentally deleterious 
activities.295 This general rigidity of legislation also created the “zero sum” mentality 
which assumes that environmental gains can only be achieved by sacrificing 
economic goals, and vice-versa.296 Moreover, mention must be made to time lags 
involved in the implementation of environmental legislation and policy. This is 
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particularly worrisome as irreparable harm is sometimes done to the environment 
before the executive remedies the situation.  
The fact that administrators often do not have the political will and the 
administrative capacity to enforce laws and policies tends to exacerbate the above 
‘policy gaps.’297 It is often found that enforcement agencies, and Local Authorities in 
particular, intent on attracting inward industrial and development investment, tend 
to turn a blind eye to practices that objectively fall short of standards and 
prohibitions in environmental laws, for financial and political motives.298 In addition, 
the government’s human resources and financial capacity is oft times found to be 
deficient for the purposes of environmental governance, especially in developing 
countries such as South Africa.299 Some authors even go as far as to say that a 
preference for the command-and-control strategy “has more to do with ensuring 
accountability to... the public... than with its ability to achieve compliance.”  
It is in this context that many jurists have in recent times looked to the common law 
to fill the ‘policy gaps’ in public environmental regulation. The common law can be 
useful to enforce government authorities to implement legislation or policy in order 
to prevent ecological harm when, for example, there is a time-lag between the 
promulgation of the legislation and the implementation thereof; or when 
environmental legislation is not enforced on account of lack of political will. The 
appropriate common law instrument in such a situation is the interdict or the 
injunction. When damage had already occurred and can be attributed to policies 
and legislation that are inadequate to achieve the government’s environmental 
goals, or when the negligence of government authorities in performing their duty 
properly or at all is the source of damage, the law of delict or tort can be applied to 
claim for the damage suffered.   
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The common law, however, is not a system of law designed for addressing the 
mischief of environmental wrongs per se. It will therefore be useful to track the 
development of the common law in environmental matters in the next section.  
4.1.2 Rise and recognition of the role of the common law in the environmental 
context 
It seems odd to search for a duty for government to guard against a novel risk in a 
system of law premised on (antiquated) Victorian foundations.300 As modernity 
heralded in the industrial era, the legal system and institutions of the day were 
gradually adapted to the then salient problems.301 Industrial age laws were directly 
imposed on Australia and South Africa as colonies of European powers during and 
after the Industrial Revolution. Old English302 and South African case law303 suggests 
that it was seen as appropriate for the law to protect merely proprietary interests 
and property rights in a society that suffered economic externalities springing from 
growing industrialisation and human populations. Modern societal values, such as 
the protection of the environment and poverty alleviation304 were not considered 
interests worthy of protection in this epoch. Although the common law was 
successfully invoked in this era against polluters and persons responsible for 
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environmental degradation, protection afforded in these cases was on an ad hoc 
basis and merely incidental to its primary goal of protecting proprietary interests.305 
It is thus no wonder that legal commentators are tepid about the role of the 
common law in environmental protection, even today.306 
The common law has not been widely regarded as appropriate law to apply in 
environmental disputes, even after environmental degradation has come to be 
regarded as a societal evil in modern times. In modern South Africa and Australia, 
the status of the common law in the greater legal regime has also ensured that the 
common take the back seat to environmental legislation in resolving environmental 
matters. In both the Australian and in the South African legal systems, the common 
law is binding only in as far as it does not conflict with the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act,307 applicable in Australia as a whole, and the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa308 respectively. In Australia, Commonwealth 
legislation309 as well as State and municipal laws are superior sources of law in 
relation to the common law.310 In South Africa also, the Roman-Dutch law is seen as 
an inferior source of law when compared to legislative law.311 The common law in 
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both jurisdictions therefore are meant to complement and supplement the laws of 
parliament. The legislatures in each jurisdiction accordingly have the power to 
codify or amend the common law as it sees fit.   
4.1.3 Problems with the role of the common law in the environmental context 
The usefulness of common law in the environmental context is, however, still 
limited. The problems usually sprout from the evolutionary roots of the common 
law. The ineptness of the common law to deal with environmental issues such as 
climate change adaptation is partly offset by its inherent flexibility, but there are 
limits to this characteristic. Moreover, as stated above, climate change adaptation is 
a polycentric issue with budgetary and political implications; and courts are typically 
unwilling to enter the realm of the policy-maker by pronouncing judgment on such 
matters. Whilst acknowledging that these issues are not the only problems 
associated with the application of the common law, only they will be explored 
below to lay the proper groundwork for the consequent discussion on specific 
English law and Roman-Dutch law doctrines.  
It is plain that feudal laws were gradually developed in the European courts in order 
to reflect changing notions of what is ‘just’ and ‘reasonable’ in an industrialised 
society.312 The courts upheld the interests of individuals vying for short-term 
economic gain at all costs, whilst rejecting conflicting interests of society at large 
desiring a better standard of living and a sense of environmental well-being.313 This 
tendency hardened into the law that is applied in our courts today. However, it is in 
this inherent flexibility of the common law314 that some authors see an opportunity 
for the judiciary to shape the common law into a legal instrument that imposes 
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liability on those responsible for environmental impairment.315 This, it is argued, 
would be in line with the new public awareness of environmental issues and would 
accordingly ensure that the tort/delict systems reflect this popular mood of the 
time.316 The need for the common law to embody the popular sentiment of the 
society at a particular time is well known in both South African and Australian 
common law. In Pearl Assurance Co Ltd v Union Government317 it was said that the 
Roman-Dutch legal system: 
‘is a virile living system of law, ever seeking, as every system must, to adapt 
itself consistently with its inherent basic principles to deal effectively with 
the increasing complexities of modern organised society.’ 
The landmark English decision, Donoghue v Stevenson,318 also ensured that English 
tort law is malleable enough for a judge to shape it into a modern system of law.319 
The development of the common law has, however, post Donoghue v Stevenson, 
been conservative in nature, with judges opting for a ‘coherent and logical’ legal 
development320 over an activist approach to achieving social relevancy for the 
common law. Development of the law of delict was similarly conservative in nature 
in the pre-Constitutional era. The dominant theme in the law of delict was to let the 
invisible hand of the market regulate issues between individuals – judgments from 
this era are almost devoid of notions of social justice321 and environmental 
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considerations.322 This is in part owing to the philosophical basis of the law of delict; 
that in the normal course of events, damage will rest where it falls. It is only in 
exceptional cases that the burden of the damage is to be shifted to the person 
responsible for such damage. And this highly individualistic notion of delict was 
emphasized by the courts in this era, much to the agony of those less fortunate 
South African citizens.323  
The exact factors that sway courts to boldly develop the common law will be 
explored later in the chapter for both jurisdictions. Suffice it to say, for the purposes 
of this section, judges therefore always tread a fine line between exercising its 
traditional role324 in applying the law, and entering the realm of the legislature or 
the executive in making new laws when deciding on the appropriateness or ripeness 
of law reform. In jurisdictions premised in the separation of powers, the judiciary is 
prohibited from performing the law- and policy-making tasks reserved for the 
executive and the legislature respectively.325 It is well-known that judicial deference 
is also applied in tort law. The deterrent function of imposing retrospective liability 
on State authorities means that courts are in effect making policy that governs 
future government conduct.326 The role of judicial deference in the law of delict is a 
moot issue and is not well documented in case law or by legal academics.  
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Owing to the biased foundations of the common law, it is naive to think that the 
tort/delict systems can entirely fill those policy gaps pointed out by Murphy.327 Nor 
should it attempt to do so. Lawyers should rather take advantage of these common 
law doctrines only when the problem warrants corrective justice to take its 
course.328 The law of delict and tort law thus potentially find application in future 
claims for climate related damage to coastal property. However, as will be shown 
below, there are still conceptual difficulties in attributing such damage to the 
State.329 It is submitted that there is still hope to overcoming these difficulties and it 
lies in the common law’s inherent adaptability to social changes. But has the world 
changed so much that the common law’s ‘industrial age’ logic has become 
obsolete? 
4.1.4 Manner in which common law sought to overcome these problems 
Beck330 and his adherents331 argue that the common law is ripe for radical reform. 
According to them, the narrow scope of the common law must be expanded if it is 
to keep up with the consequences of modernity. Modernisation brings with it new 
dangers and risks which the common law, owing to its established rules of 
attribution and liability, cannot adequately address. The consequences of these 
dangers and risks are often unknown and are therefore tentatively regulated or 
remain unregulated by State agencies, laws and policies. Although the relevant 
theory is discussed only in the light of modern risks such as genetically modified 
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organisms and nuclear waste,332 it can be argued that climate change should be 
incorporated as a ‘hazard’ that warrants management by the State.333 
State intervention and scientific ‘solutions’ no longer suffice in an epoch where ‘the 
least likely event occurs in the long run.’334 The force of state regulation is often 
compromised by prior negotiations between the regulators and the regulated and 
hence ineffectively allocates the risks that modern society holds. The following can 
also be said of scientific authority on safety matters: 
‘... a science that extends its claims of accuracy to the investigation of 
repercussions, turns in fact into a theatre of the absurd: precisions refutes precision. 
Risk calculators can be variously interpreted, and so they retur  full of mathematics 
and contradictory recommendations...’335 
It is for this reason that ‘risk society’ is no longer content to defer to scientific 
authority when it comes to exposure to risk.336 Claims that society informally 
mistrusts public institutions are also hardly surprising.337 Against the background of 
the alienation of society from government and the scientific community, society 
itself now determines the level of risk it is prepared to tolerate.338 This requires 
‘inclusiveness, transparency and candid acknowledgement that unavoidably moral 
choices are being undertaken’339 – a standpoint often associated with the 
precautionary principle.340  
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Proponents of the latter principle recognise that uncertainty itself is a subject of 
control, power and influence in society. It can be used in an ‘agent-neutral’ way or 
in an ‘agent-relative’ way.341 It conveniently places government in a position 
whereby it may, for example, discount a quantitive assessment of potential climate-
related damage both for time and likelihood when weighing it up against potential 
expenditure that may be incurred when taking adaptive measures.342 In this way, 
decision-makers are removed from the consequences of ‘omission’ if the worst-case 
scenario, or extensive damage to inappropriately placed or built coastal private 
property, eventuates (‘agent-neutral’).343 Risk society would find such a ‘cost-
benefit’ analysis unacceptable. Instead, it would find it desirable for governments to 
act in accordance with new established norms such as intergenerational equity and 
sustainable development.344 In other words, preventative action must be taken by 
government, allowing the public to participate in the decision-making process, if 
future claims against State agencies for climate-related damage to coastal private 
property are to be avoided (‘agent-relative’).       
Unfortunately, as Lee345 points out, the English courts (for instance) have not 
explored what level of risk society is willing to endure in the light of modern 
environmental norms, such as the precautionary principle; or whether government 
regulation is sufficiently transparent and accounts for the interests of all affected 
parties.346 Their first instinct in environmental risk cases has been to ‘stand aside’ 
and place its trust in the government’s approach to dealing with the risk. This is 
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often justified by the notion that courts must avoid making pronouncements on 
controversial political matters.347 Its second instinct is to uphold the logic of the 
common law rigidly for the sake of coherency and logic, even when such a practice 
results in obvious injustice towards a person or group of persons (often the 
applicant). Such an approach has prompted some serious debate over the extent to 
which the English common law is flexible. In South Africa, an environmental right 
can now be found amongst the list of basic human rights in the Constitution.348 This 
right has the potential to influence the operation of the law of delict in ways that is 
beneficial to the environment. The application of this right in the private law sphere 
will be explored below in more detail.349 However, the judiciary is yet to hear a case 
involving the application of the Aquilian action (the common law instrument that 
provides for a claim in damages) in an environmental matter. Only time will tell 
whether this right can shape the law of delict into a useful tool in the fight against 
climate change and other environmental hazards.350 
While it recognised that the common law must develop in a coherent and logical 
manner, this must not be overemphasized by judges. The point of tort law and the 
law of delict is to draw boundaries between what is acceptable and what is 
unacceptable, or between what is normal and what is abnormal.351 If we accept 
Beck’s risk theory, society’s perception of what is normal and what is abnormal is 
rapidly shifting in our modern era marked by environmental risk. It has become 
unacceptable for government not to manage and regulate public risks, such as 
climate change, as far as their human and financial capital allows; and to manage 
risks in isolation from those who stand to lose if the risk eventuates. Not even the 
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smallest risk must be unaccounted for; especially against the backdrop of these 
values and rights now being enshrined in the South African Constitution.  
Furthermore, the common law’s evolution must be inextricable from advances in 
regulatory policies and laws so that the latter are complemented and supplemented 
by the common law. It will be recalled that tort law and the law of delict are 
founded on theories of corrective justice and it often offers the only means 
whereby an aggrieved party may recover damages suffered as a result of the 
eventuation of a risk. It remains the only remedy for those affected by past wrongs. 
If the common law is allowed to fall behind, two divergent systems of law might 
emerge and confidence in the legal system could be undermined.352 
Environmental lawyers are well aware of the limitations of tort law in 
environmental cases – it will only be of use where a culprit can be identified and 
where proprietary damage was suffered or will be suffered. Such a system has been 
shown to be antiquated in an age when it is expected of regulators to manage 
public risks. The Australian and South African governments are not directly to blame 
for climate change and its consequences, but will they be to blame for not 
managing the risks to the best of their abilities, by adapting to future climate 
related sea level rise, storm tide inundation and floods in coastal regions? It was 
shown above that neither government has yet undertaken serious commitments 
toward this goal. Perhaps a future claim in tort (or delict) against the State for 
damage to coastal private property that is attributable to a failure by government 
to fulfil a duty to protect its citizens against climate related coastal hazards today, 
will offer a good platform for the discussion of the common law’s limitations in 
environmental law cases. The following sections will explore the possibility of such a 
claim against the State being successful, keeping in mind the paradigm confusion of 
the common law. 
4.2 A duty to adapt to climate change under tort law 
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4.2.1 General principles of the tort of negligence 
Negligence emerged in English law as a separate tort only in the early 19th century. 
Before the emergence of this tort, only a numerus clausus of situations where the 
respondent had been careless evoked the victims’ right to claim damages. Today it 
is understood as a distinct set of principles that generally find application when as a 
result of a person’s negligence, another had suffered damage.353 These principles 
are now well-established and are coherently summarised in the words of Lord 
Wright:354 
‘in a strict legal analysis, negligence means more than heedless or careless conduct, 
whether in omission or commission: it properly connotes the complex concept of 
duty, breach, and damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the duty was 
owing.’ 
We thus see that ‘negligence’ as understood in this doctrine is composed of four 
elements: the wrongdoer must have owed a duty of care to the victim at the time of 
the conduct;355 the wrongdoer must have acted negligently toward the victim; the 
conduct must have caused the victim damage;356 and a sufficiently strong causal link 
between the conduct and the damage involved is also required.357  
The first requirement, or the duty of care requirement, is submitted to be the most 
problematic requirement of the four in establishing negligence in a claim for 
climate-related damage.358 As stated above, it shall be the focus of this enquiry. 
Issues that may impact on the duty of care concept will subsequently be covered. 
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Firstly, the application of the political question doctrine359 in tort law will be 
explored. It requires the courts not to violate the separation of powers by unduly 
encroaching on the policy-making powers of the executive and the law-making 
powers of the legislature. Secondly, the impact of ‘tort reforms’360  or legislative 
Acts limiting the court’s discretion in tort matters will be discussed in the climate 
change context.  
4.2.2 Basic requirements for establishing duty under tort law 
The ‘duty’ element has been held to be the common law’s own limitation device on 
conceivably limitless liability.361 A duty of care can only be imposed in law on a legal 
person under prescribed circumstances and when certain prescribed interests have 
been injured or damaged.362 As in any legal system based on consistency and 
fairness, these circumstances and interests are prescribed in legal precedent. In 
other words, a set of well-established principles must apply equally in a case before 
the court as it did in a previous case with similar facts. In this way, certain interests 
are always protected by the tort of negligence whilst others remain unprotected. 
However, there are cases in which principles for a particular set of facts have not 
yet been developed. These are called ‘novel cases.’ Climate change adaptation falls 
into this category as the Australian courts are yet to develop set principles on the 
subject.  
The Australian High Court has realised the futility of attempting to devise a fixed 
formula which would serve as a general test of duty in novel cases363 and have of 
late opted for the so-called multi-factorial approach in dealing with these cases.364 
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According to this approach, ‘reasonable foresight’ is the only fixed prerequisite for 
ascertaining a duty. In environmental tort cases, the foreseeability enquiry is often 
one that revolves around the human understanding of how the world works.365 The 
current scientific consensus suggests that coastal regions inhabited by man will be 
affected by global warming in the future. If one accepts that the courts have 
developed and is still developing the concept of ‘reasonableness’ with the aid of 
scientific evidence,366 it can thus also be accepted that climate-related damage to 
coastal private property is at least reasonably foreseeable in the light of several 
reports released and scientific investigations conducted by the Queensland 
government itself.367 This is especially so since cases have been decided on much 
less compelling scientific evidence than the evidence on future climate change 
impacts.368   
However, it is not in itself sufficient; it sets in motion additional inquiries,369 the 
content and nature of which depends on the facts of each case.370 These enquiries 
are known in Australian tort law as the ‘salient factors’371 and are taken into 
account when establishing a duty of care in a particular instance. Only those 
traditional factors that are appropriate to the facts of the case are applied by the 
courts. Salient factors particularly apposite to climate change adaption include the 
degree of control the authority had over the situation eventually causing 
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damage;372 the ‘proximity’ of the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant;373 the vulnerability and specificity of the group who feel that their loss 
should be attributed to the negligence of the State;374 and the knowledge of the risk 
involved.375 This area of the common law is typically developed by the inclusion of 
novel factors. 
Whereas ‘reasonable foresight’ and the various ‘salient factors’ constitute the 
general principles that are applied in all cases, additional considerations apply in 
specific torts. Torts involving ‘statutory duties or powers’ and ‘omissions’ are forms 
of specific torts relevant to this discussion. Considerations relevant to ‘statutory’ 
torts and ‘omission’ torts must be applied if a plaintiff contends that state or local 
authorities failed to make (effective) climate change adaptation policy or that these 
authorities failed to implement existing policies and legislation (properly). What 
follows is the application of the general and specific ’duty of care’ principles to the 
climate change scenario set out in the introduction of this dissertation. 
At common law, even a public authority may be subjected, under appropriate 
circumstances, to a duty of care in the exercise of statutory powers.376 Thus the 
duty of care principle is also applied in negligence cases involving a public 
authority,377 despite this doctrine perhaps sitting uncomfortably in the public 
sphere.378 If a state or local authority omits to fulfil its ‘target duty’379 of protecting 
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coastal dwellers from the future effects of climate change by making use of one of 
its various statutory powers to implement adaptation measures (or attempts to do 
so, but does so ineffectively), a claim in negligence is not inconceivable where 
damage is suffered as a result. Although all the above factors are relevant, the 
‘control’ factor is of particular importance to the application of the duty concept in 
these cases.380  
Road authorities in Australia, for example, have a high measure of control over the 
condition of roads in the country and therefore owe a duty of care to road users.381 
Similarly, prison authorities are often burdened with a duty of care to the public not 
to let prisoners escape and cause damage, owing to the high degree of control over 
prisoners.382 It is submitted that local and state authorities have a large degree of 
control over the condition of the Queensland coast. They are afforded 
custodianship over the Queensland coast and have a myriad of devices that allow 
them to take adaptation measures, such as building lines, under the CPMA, 
reflecting the projected sea-level rise and shifts in coastal flood plains.  
Similarly, the state agencies have a large measure of control over the IDAS 
framework. The Minister can, for instance, declare development in the coastal zone 
assessable development or prohibited development to ensure that climate change 
considerations are not neglected in coastal development. Assessment managers 
and concurrence agencies also have control over assessing development 
applications and therefore ensuring that climate change considerations are taken 
into account. They also have control over appending conditions to development 
approvals to ensure that buildings are resilient to projected climate-related hazards. 
The degree of control in this regard is perhaps analogous to the measure of control 
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building authorities have over building-supervision functions. The courts have on 
many occasions held that building authorities owe certain members of the public a 
duty of care not to be negligent in performing their building-supervision functions 
when, for example a building authority failed to notice a defect in the building 
plan;383 when the plans did not comply with building regulations;384 and when the 
building authorities failed to issue the owner of a building with a warning that his 
building is subject to slipping.385   
The relationship of proximity between the relevant state or local authorities and 
those that have suffered climate-related damage is another guiding principle386 that 
may well assist a court in its decision-making process relating to the relevant facts 
at hand. The courts have held that a stevedoring authority’s relationship in 
proximity to waterside workers was sufficiently close for there to be a duty of care 
on the former to protect the latter from exposure to asbestos, even those not 
permanently employed by the authority.387 The authority was given statutory 
powers to enter into a contract of temporary employment with workers, but was 
required by the same statute to ensure the safe performance of stevedoring 
operations. The vulnerability of the workers was also taken into account.388 It is 
submitted that there is a similar duty of care on planning authorities to protect 
people from exposure to future coastal hazards. The SPA as well as the SPP 1/03 
and the SCMP require planning authorities to take into account the future effects of 
climate change in planning decisions and therewith ensuring the safety of coastal 
dwellers. Those with property in the coastal zone, especially those without adaptive 
capacity such as the Torres Strait Islanders, are vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change and therefore rely on government to ensure that buildings are made 
resilient to water-related hazards or their expeditious relocation to safer land.   
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The relationship of proximity between assessment managers or concurrency 
agencies and coastal property owners is also submitted to be sufficiently close for 
the former to owe a duty of care to the latter when assessing development. Such a 
duty of care would be to take into consideration the future effect of climate change 
when assessing development application or to prescribe appropriate conditions to 
development permits in the coastal zone. Thus an owner of property in the coastal 
zone aggrieved as a result of climate-related damage to the said property may well 
argue in future legal proceedings that a past decision (our present day) to grant a 
development permit over his property was negligent because it did not account for 
projected levels of sea-level rise or require the property owner to adapt her 
property to future sea-level rise and violent storms by means of, for example, 
innovative drainage systems. After all, state and local authorities are responsible for 
land use planning mechanisms such as IDAS and for climate change adaptation, 
making applicants and other members of the public reliant on their decisions. Such 
a decision would be in line with past decisions to, for example, hold manufacturers 
liable for damage caused by defective products.389 The fact that the effects of global 
warming will only occur much later or that present decisions do not influence 
present property owners is not inimical to the imposition of a duty of care on state 
and local authorities. That is to say, proximity need not be either physical or 
temporal for it to be conducive to a court’s finding a duty of care.390     
Knowledge,391 vulnerability and specificity392 are factors that might also impact on a 
negligence ruling. Current human knowledge of these coastal threats driven by 
climate change might well be crucial in a future case such as the one being 
discussed. The potential effects of climate change have only in recent times been 
the subject of scientific study and the results that these studies have yielded 
suggest that projections are more accurate on a macro scale, but it still leaves much 
to be desired on a local or micro scale. It is worth noting that limited and novel 
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knowledge on future possible harm-causing omissions has two implications. Firstly, 
only planning instruments adopted or altered and development applications 
assessed of late can be the subject of complaint in the future. Planning and 
development decisions taken in past years may not be considered to be negligent 
on account of the limited knowledge and understanding of climate change at the 
disposal of an authority responsible for taking them. Secondly, it is only when the 
power provided by a statutory provision is so specific as to require the local 
authority charged with the implementation thereof to protect individuals in the 
position of the complainant against harm that a duty of care on behalf of a statutory 
body can be said to exist. In other words, the complainant must be reliant on 
government intervention before there can be said to be a duty of care in such an 
instance.393 Therefore, the fact that climate change ‘losers’ have not yet been 
identified in great specificity (other than the Torres Strait Islanders) by Australian 
and Queensland policy can be detrimental to an contention that government has a 
duty in law to adapt to climate change.  
In the English tradition a duty is more easily established in the case of a misfeasance 
than in the case of a nonfeasance. This is an important distinction in the context of 
this dissertation, which focuses on an omission by government to take adequate 
adaptation measures to guard against the ills of climate change. A mere omission 
can never give rise to a duty of care;394 a plaintiff must show that there was a 
‘legally recognised pre-existing’ duty on the part of the defendant to act for a new 
duty of care to be established at common law.395 The relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant (an aggrieved owner of property, which was damaged 
by climate-related hazards, and the State) will play an important role in establishing 
a duty to act and therefore a new duty of care at common law.396 The nature of the 
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relationship between planning authorities and coastal property owners has already 
been discussed. The former is in control of the future spatial planning and land use 
in the state of Queensland, whereas the latter is reliant on the proper performance 
of these functions, which means that planning policy-decisions and assessment 
decisions must reflect projections on how climate change is going to affect the 
coast. Just as employers have a duty to create and maintain a safe working 
environment for employees,397 planning authorities have a duty to create and 
maintain safe habitats for inhabitants of towns and cities in Queensland. 
Inhabitants and employees alike, have little or no control over the general 
conditions of their towns and workplaces respectively.   
Australian judgments imposing a ‘legally recognised pre-existing’ duty to act on the 
defendant398 on account of a preceding undertaking of a task which leads another 
to rely on its being performed, is not out of the ordinary. Claims by state and 
Commonwealth government to take the lead in climate change adaptation efforts 
may well be found to constitute such an undertaking, contributing to the likelihood 
of the existence of a duty to act under the circumstances. Furthermore, if the 
danger or risk eventually causing harm is attributable to the defendant, the 
likelihood of there being a duty to act in law is substantially heightened.399 Granting 
a development authorisation unconditionally in parts of the coastal zone that is 
predicted to be affected by climate change may well be interpreted as an action 
that exposed the hypothetical plaintiff to climate change risk and thereby ‘creating 
a danger.’       
Finally, the court has discretion to set precedent by considering a novel factor 
unique to the facts of the case. Australian courts may in the future consider the 
precautionary approach and public participation as a ‘salient factor’ in climate 
change litigation. The inclusion of such an ad hoc factor may well be justified on the 
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grounds that corrective justice demands that the authorities responsible for the 
tentative regulation and management of the risk of climate change be held 
accountable for the resulting damage, under certain circumstances.  
The sooner the courts realise their roles in the climate change debate, the smoother 
our transition into the ‘risk’ era would be. The amount of faith placed in the 
regulatory authorities in the level of caution adopted in development decisions in 
recent cases400 in Queensland is unacceptable. Conveniently deferring to the 
wisdom of local authorities in development decisions can vitiate the ‘deterrent 
effect’ of the law.401 Developing the common law at an early stage in the 
advancement of climate change, can galvanise local authorities into a determined 
effort to effectively adapt to climate change to avoid future claims.    
4.2.3 Factors impacting on the application of duty 
The law of ‘duty of care’ is in reality even more complex than its depiction in the 
above section. In its application in the ‘public sphere,’ it is influenced by the 
doctrine of the separation of powers and certain ‘tort reform’ laws. These two 
limitations may exclude the justiciability of a claim against an authority charged 
with performing public duties. The dissertation now turns to discuss these issues in 
the context of climate change adaptation.  
Legal equality, or the universal subjection of all classes to one legal system 
administered by the court, is an important democratic value. Deviation from this 
rule cannot occur without some sort of legal justification. A well-known deviation in 
English common law is the exclusion of policy decisions by public bodies from 
judicial scrutiny. In other words, the courts may not impose a duty of care on public 
bodies when undertaking political tasks.402 In Australian law, this is often called the 
political question doctrine. It asks whether the court, in its evaluation of the 
reasonableness of conduct (whether or not conduct was ‘negligent’), is asked to 
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make an essentially ‘political’ pronouncement, one that would best be left for the 
executive or the legislature. Strict separation of powers is regularly justified by the 
fact that courts lack the necessary technical expertise, possessed by the executive 
and the legislature in their specialist roles, to make or amend policy.403 However, 
there are no hard and fast rules to deciding this question; it is always evaluated on 
the facts of each case.404 
This doctrine is often also referred to as the planning/operational dichotomy 
because ‘planning’ decisions405 are to be avoided by the courts whereas the 
judiciary feels comfortable pronouncing on ‘operational decisions.’ In making 
‘planning decisions,’ or those that are based on the exercise of policy options or 
discretions, and involving or dictated by social, political, financial or economic 
considerations,406 a public body owes no duty of care to anyone who has, as a result 
suffered loss or injury.407 Immunity, however, is only valid in so far as the decision is 
not ‘ultra vires.’ If a discretionary function is so unreasonably exercised that no 
reasonable public entity in the position of that public entity exercising the function 
would come to the same decision;408 and the discretionary function so exercised 
causes loss or injury to another, then the ‘planning’ defence will be unavailable to 
that public entity.409 On the other hand, the courts must be careful not to 
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emasculate the defence and to assess the policy’s merits, and will therefore 
naturally be reluctant to uphold the ‘ultra vires’ reply.410   
‘Operational’ decisions, by contrast, are reviewable by courts in a suit for 
negligence. These decisions entail the implementation of policy and thus merely 
amount to the product of administrative direction or expert opinion.411 Such a 
decision need not be invalid from a public law perspective for it to be actionable; 
negligence and invalidity are two very different, yet confusable concepts. In 
practice, it is not always easy to discern planning decisions from policy decisions, 
but the distinction remains crucial.412  
The content of broad national and state climate change adaptation policies applying 
in Queensland probably fall within the ‘planning’ category. The COAG’s National 
Climate Change Adaptation Framework, the State Greenhouse Policy413 and the 
ClimateSmart Adaptation Strategy are broad statements of policy resultant from a 
policy discretion exercised by the executive arms of government, and influenced by 
environmental and socio-economic conditions in the country and the state. The 
planning/operational dichotomy will thus prove to be an insuperable obstacle to 
challenging these decisions on merit. These policies may be lacking in specificity, 
but those responsible for drafting them cannot be said to have erred by considering 
irrelevant factors or overstepping the limit of their mandates. They are after all 
general policy statements that need to be fleshed out414 and implemented415 at 
state and local level.  
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The more specific Queensland policies and legislation may also enjoy the protection 
of the political doctrine. According to the political question doctrine, the courts are 
prohibited from deciding on the efficacy of these policy statements. The SCMP, the 
two mentioned RCMPs and the SPP 1/03 were all drafted to influence decisions and 
action by local government in accordance with the Sustainable Planning Act. These 
decisions and action by local government, in accordance with Commonwealth and 
state policy, will therefore likely not be protected by the political doctrine. Local 
authorities are strictly bound by these statutory instruments in all that they do; and 
it is therefore essential for them to incorporate these policy considerations into 
decisions taken in regard to coastal planning and development. Any negligent 
omission being the source of harm to another will be actionable.416  
But what of unreasonably exercised policy powers? Much has been written on the 
desirability of the planning/operational dichotomy, but the comments of Thorpe417 
in a recent article contextualise this debate within the realm of climate change 
litigation. She emphasises that the legislative and policy-formation processes are 
often flawed by a lack of participation, accountability and transparency; leading to 
public mistrust of government institutions. Big business, often the biggest polluters, 
is also often more influential in these processes than those that will ultimately be 
affected by them owing to the large amount of money paid for political lobbying.418 
If the judicial participation in policy-making is eliminated by the ‘political question 
doctrine,’ then the administrative and law-making powers would enjoy unchecked 
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power.419 The role of the courts can thus be argued to be a valuable complement to 
policy-making powers,420 and particularly those associated with climate change.  
And the judicial influence in policy-making is apparently not uncommon, at least in 
the USA, also an English common law jurisdction. The courts are known to ‘stray’ 
into the realm of the political from time to time especially in the field of 
administrative law. Thorpe points out that where this has happened, court-made 
policy was not found to be necessarily inferior to legislative or executive laws and 
policies. On the contrary, the courts’ ability to pronounce on complex social issues 
has been applauded in recent studies. It was shown that courts make use of ‘social 
science data and public policy analysis; grant injunctive remedies; hear multi-party 
litigation; actively supervise the implementation of decisions after disputes are 
declared resolved and apply broad principles prospectively with potential impacts 
on individuals not involved in litigation.’421 Therefore, it has been argued that the 
critique to the effect that the courts lack the necessary expertise to make policy 
decisions applies equally to the other two arms of government.422  
It is at this point also useful to illuminate the proposition that ‘tort law is a form of 
regulation and always has been.’423 Tort law, though ex ante in application, has the 
ability to change prospective behaviour.424 For instance, if local authorities were 
aware of their potential liability in tort for not taking effective climate change 
adaptation measures, they would do everything in their power and resources to 
avoid such liability, particularly since coastal property is highly valued. Its historical 
and future usefulness in ‘unregulated areas’ and ‘partly regulated areas’ should 
therefore come as no surprise. It must be reiterated that tort law is ultimately and 
inextricably linked to social conditions and convixtions. It also changes according to 
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the changes in social opinion.425 It was argued above that climate change is a public 
risk well-known to most people in Queensland. If a court finds that ‘social science 
data’ indicates that the public finds it unacceptable for government not to adapt to 
climate change, it should be able to intervene and not to be tied down by inflexible 
boundaries to the exercise of its powers. 
If such an argument is taken seriously by the legislature, it is free to intervene by 
overriding court discretion in climate change matters by passing tort reforms, such 
as the Civil Liability Act426 (CLA) in Queensland. The CLA is the source of another 
significant factor that will count against a future climate change litigant in a 
negligence action. Sections 13-16 of this Act state that Councils will not be liable for 
‘obvious risks’ or for the materialisation of ‘inherent risks.’ An obvious risk is a risk 
where the type or kind of risk is patent or a matter of common knowledge.’427 This 
is worrisome since a presumption of the vulnerability of coastal property to sea 
level rise, coastal inundation and coastal erosion, might arise in the light of greater 
media coverage of the risks created by climate change to coastal property.428 
However, will the courts require that coastal property owners carry the same 
degree of knowledge as local authorities on the effects of climate change on coastal 
areas? Those employed by a local authority in the position of a town planner, 
presumably have expert knowledge on hazards that may affect the built 
environment, including future hazards.  
An inherent risk, on the other hand, is a risk that cannot be avoided with the 
exercise of reasonable care.429 The cost of a particular climate change adaptation 
measure is pivotal in a determination of the reasonableness of such a measure. 
Costly engineering and demolition works necessary to minimise the exposure of 
coastal property to erosion or storm tide inundation can be argued to fall in the 
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‘unreasonable’ bracket.430 But one should keep in mind that parts of coastal 
Queensland will be subjected to potentially huge climate-related losses; this may 
justify the high cost of adaptation. Nevertheless, we are still awaiting judicial 
pronouncement on the construction of these statutory phrases. 
4.3 A duty to adapt to climate change under the law of delict 
4.3.1 General principles of the law of delict 
The law of delict has been said to be a ‘detailed body of principles, rules and 
concepts founded on historically-developed broad bases of liability.’431 To found 
liability in each case, there must be wrongful, negligent (or intentional) conduct that 
caused the defendant damage.432 We therefore see that there are five elements to 
a delictual act: conduct, unlawfulness, fault and damage. ‘Unlawfulness’ means that 
conduct must be legally reprehensible, or wrongful, to found liability in each case. 
In other words, there must be a legal duty on a person to act or to refrain from 
acting in a certain manner.433    
4.3.2 Basic requirements for establishing unlawfulness under delict 
The standard for unlawfulness in novel cases such as the one being discussed,434  is 
generally the legal convictions of the community or the boni mores.435 The test for 
establishing a ‘legal duty’ can be formulated as follows: 
‘In any given situation the question is asked whether the defendant’s conduct was 
reasonable according to the legal convictions of the community.’
436  
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The test is objective and one based on reasonableness.437 Generally speaking, the 
test involves the balancing of the interests ‘promoted’ by the defendant’s act or 
omission and those interests infringed by the same conduct.438 Factors that play an 
important role in the balancing process are, amongst others, the probable or 
potential extent of the harm suffered by others; the degree of risk of the 
materialisation of such harm; the nature of the interests that the defendant or 
society or both had in the relevant conduct; whether there are measures available 
to the defendant to avoid the harm; the chances of these measure being successful; 
and whether the costs associated with such measure would be proportional to the 
possible harm caused.439 Considerations of public policy or public interest will 
influence this balancing process.440  
Furthermore, when the conduct takes the form of an omission, the unlawfulness or 
otherwise of that conduct depends on the presence of a legal duty to act in order to 
avoid the harm under the circumstances.441 In applying the standard of the boni 
mores, the courts have been assisted by certain factors. There is a strong indication 
of the presence of a legal duty is if there was prior conduct by the defendant that 
created a new source of danger which was not subsequently eliminated.442 The 
degree of control exercised by the defendant over the situation will also play an 
important role in establishing such a duty.443 Rules of law can also be interpreted as 
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being indicative of a legal duty on the plaintiff to act to avoid harm.444 Moreover, 
the relationship between the parties as well as the reliance by the plaintiff on the 
defendant may also be weighted into the court’s decision-making process.445  
Delictual action against government on account of its failure to adapt to the adverse 
impacts of climate change can take at least two forms. Firstly, a claim that national 
and provincial policy and statutory frameworks were inadequate at addressing 
climate-related coastal hazards; or that they were not properly implemented is 
conceivable.446 Secondly, one can envisage delictual proceedings to be based on a 
failure to take into consideration climate change when assessing environmental 
impact assessments for development in the coastal zone.447 These two possible 
claims will now be applied to the standard of the boni mores. It must also be noted 
that conduct in these cases take the form of omissions and that the principles and 
factors specific and unique to this form of conduct, as listed above, will then be 
explicated in the context of the two possible claims. 
Generally, the ‘boni mores’ test means weighing up the harm caused to the plaintiff 
and the benefits of the harm causing conduct. In the case at hand, total damages 
calculated to be suffered as a result of climate change may well be compared to the 
total expenses that would have been incurred had effective adaptation measures 
been taken (these savings will be assumed to be a benefit to society).448 
Furthermore, if one accepts that courts act, like other government agencies, and 
discount the quantum of damages for time and likelihood,449 then our present 
knowledge of future climate change and its effects will be crucial. It will be recalled 
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that IPCCC’s classification of the effects being ‘highly likely’ and ‘likely’ to 
materialise450 makes it more probable than not that the risk of sea-level rise and 
coastal inundation will occur in the long run. However, the time lag between the 
omission to adapt the coastal zone to climate change and the future damage may 
be as long as a century, thus tipping the scales of the justice in favour of the 
defendant. Such arguments hold for both alleged defective planning policies and 
alleged defecting environmental authorisations. 
In omission cases involving a public body, whether there was a duty to act or not 
was very strongly affected by whether there was prior conduct of that government 
body. Although it is no longer a requirement, it still plays an important role in 
establishing a duty in ‘municipality cases.’451 If planning policies, such IDPs and 
spatial development plans, authorise and plan for urban development in areas 
predicted to be affected by climate change, it may well be contended that this 
amounts to ‘prior conduct’ as currently understood in South African delictual law. 
Planning that does not take into account future sea-level rise and changes to the 
flood plains, places people and property in danger of being injured and damaged 
respectively. Similarly, if provincial environmental authorities grant an 
environmental authorisation for coastal development whilst not being mindful of 
future climate change in an area, then it may be said a municipality created a new 
danger not only for those who applied for the property to be developed, but also 
future owners of the said property.452  
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It is well known that the coastal zone is the responsibility of the government. The 
environment is placed under the trusteeship of the South African State in NEMA453 
and the coastal zone is also to be managed by the government on behalf of the 
public of South Africa.454 It is therefore contended that the government has control 
over the state of coastal human environment, much as it has control over the state 
of the roads in South Africa.455 This relationship of control may warrant a general 
reliance on provincial government or municipal councils to make and implement 
climate change adaptation policy. The reliance will be even stronger for those who 
do not have the financial or other means to guard against the future climate ills.456   
Closely related to the control and reliance factors is the question whether a rule of 
law457 was indicative of a legal duty under the circumstances.458 This relevance of 
this factor the dissertation is high, owing to a ‘strong vertical dimension’ to 
‘omission jurisprudence’ in post-apartheid South Africa. 459 The interpretation of a 
particular statutory provision or policy statement is often crucial to the significance 
of this factor. In interpreting a statute for the purposes of delictual law, the courts 
consider the context in which a statutory provision must be read. It is also clear that 
non-compliance with a rule so interpreted is not necessarily unlawful; it must still 
be fair and equitable under the circumstances to compensate the person 
wronged.460 This is determined with reference to the boni mores and legal policy.461 
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Lastly, a statute can also be an aid to establish other relevant factors. For instance, 
it has been said that a statute that is interpreted as conferring a power on an 
authority to act, is indicative of control over a situation.462 ‘Control’ as a factor is 
discussed in the above paragraph.   
The South African environmental law regime, as described in section 3.3 above is at 
least indicative of control over the human environment and the coastal zone. The 
public trust doctrine is a principle of both NEMA and the environmental right. 
Furthermore, it is explicitly stated in the NEMICMA and White Paper on Sustainable 
Coastal Development that the government shall hold the coastal zone in trust for 
present and future generations of all citizens (owners of the coastal zone). 
Moreover, the Constitution places the provincial and municipal tiers of government 
in control of provincial463 and municipal464 planning respectively. A myriad of 
devices that can be used to justify adaptation policy and ensure adaptation 
implementation were also enumerated in section 3.3. There can thus be little doubt 
that the government has control over climate change adaptation policy and 
implementation thereof. Similarly, the NEMA places provincial environmental 
authorities in complete control over the environmental authorisation process, just 
as it has been said that this body has control over building and development 
authorisation (so long as there is a close relationship between the plaintiff and the 
provincial authority).465   
The interplay of various other factors peculiar to the facts of the case will also be 
determinative of the presence of a legal duty in omission cases.466 In Cape Town 
Municipality v Bakkerud,467 for instance, the court sought to strike a balance of 
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proportionality between a person’s responsibility to use the roads in a prudent 
manner and the municipality’s responsibility to maintain the roads. The 
unacceptable state of the road and the extended period of time since the last repair 
work was done on the roads in the area influenced the court to hold that there was 
a legal duty on the municipality to fill a pothole in a sidewalk in its jurisdiction, 
leading to personal injury to the plaintiff. In Cape Town Metropolitan Council v 
Graham,468 the court was mindful that the municipality was in a better position than 
the ordinary road user to predict rock falls and therefore better able to warn road 
users of the potential danger or closing the road. As a result, the court found that 
the municipality owed a duty of care to road users in Chapman’s Peak to prevent 
injury as a result of falling rocks.  
The courts will thus have regard to legal convictions of the community regarding 
climate change adaptation in South Africa in the present day. The future effect of 
climate change is submitted to be a societal concern in South Africa. There is thus a 
growing expectation for government to protect people from these future ills. 
People perceive government to be in a better position to take the lead in 
adaptation initiatives owing to a better understanding and greater information on 
the future climate-related damage than the average South African. Furthermore, it 
is expected of government to provide indigent communities with essential services, 
such as safe housing. It might therefore be held that society regards it as imperative 
for government to, at least, assist those without adaptive capacity to adapt to 
climate change. Inaction on climate change adaptation may well be held to be 
unacceptable. 
4.3.3 Factors impacting on application of duty 
In the South African delictual system, there are factors that can exclude a claim 
against government and others that may make a claim more likely. The doctrine of 
the separation of powers is an example of the former and the Constitution an 
example of the latter. These are submitted to be the most significant factors that 
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impact on the hypothetical future delictual claim against the government of the 
Republic of South Africa on account of it not taking climate change adapatation 
measures and will be explored below. 
The South African Constitution is founded on the doctrine of the separation of 
powers.469 It is therefore usually the case that the courts are prohibited from 
performing the law-making and policy-making duties of the legislature and the 
executive respectively. The Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa, however, is yet to 
develop clear rules or guidelines governing the limitation of claims in delict against 
the state under the Constitutional dispensation. Clues as to the application of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers in the law of delict can be found in statutory 
law and in case law. The State Liability Act,470 for instance, provides that ‘*c+laims 
against the State which would, if that claim had arisen against a person, be the 
ground of an action in any competent court, shall be cognizable by such court...’ We 
thus notice a broad policy-making power of the judiciary in South Africa.471         
However, it is often said in obiter that the courts must not radically reform the law 
in its development of the common law.472 Judges have a duty to develop the 
common law, but only to the extent that the legal convictions of the community 
demand it. The boni mores will determine whether the imposition of a legal duty on 
government amounts to overstepping its mandate under the Constitution. This 
principle was applied in Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud.473 The judge in the 
matter firstly admitted that if it were to award damages in the instant case, it would 
be performing a policy-making role. Therefore a court will be overstepping the 
boundaries of its policy-making powers if it finds a duty to exist contrary to the legal 
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convictions of the community. In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-
Natal),474 on the other hand, the court was loath to decide on a ‘polycentric’ issue 
that has wide budgetary implications for the other spheres of government. The 
abstinence of the court to decide on such an issue was made in the context of an 
attempt to hold government liable for not fulfilling its socio-economic duties under 
the Constitution. 
The public nature of a defendant in a future case involving the lack of policy on 
climate change adaptation (or the implementation thereof) may be found to have 
little impact on the justiciability of a claim if it is found that the legal convictions of 
the community is such that there must be a legal duty on government to take 
adaptation measures against climate change. Wide policy and planning decisions 
relating to climate change adaptation, on the other hand, may thus well be found to 
be non-justiciable on the grounds that courts cannot prescribe how the fiscal purse 
is to be spent. It is submitted that expensive climate change adaptation measures 
such as the relocation of poor households to higher and safer grounds should have 
been taken, may well be excluded on the grounds of separation of powers; whilst a 
claim that an inexpensive preventative measure (such as the present prohibition of 
ribbon development in coastal zone that is projected to be affected by climate 
change by proscribing it in planning instruments such as an IDP) should have been 
taken may well be found to be justiciable. An environmental authorization of 
development i  the coastal zone today that does not take into account the 
projected levels of sea-level rise and coastal inundation may also not be protected 
by the doctrine of the separation of the powers.         
If the claim is found to be justiciable, the extent to which the court is willing to 
develop the common law may well be crucial. In novel delictual cases such as the 
one being discussed, the common law is developed and shaped into an instrument 
capable of addressing new concerns. It must be noted that the development of the 
common law is not a novel idea that finds its origin in the new Constitutional 
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paradigm. The judiciary has always had the power to develop the common law in 
order for it to reflect the changing norms and values of the South African society, or 
the boni mores.475 This general power of the High Courts and the Appeal Courts to 
mould the common law into a set of rules that is more appropriate for modern 
society, however, is now no longer a mere power,476 but a constitutional duty.477 
This is clear from section 39(2) of the Constitution which provides that the courts 
must promote the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ when developing 
the common law. In Du Plessis v De Klerk,478 Kriegler J explained that the Bill of 
Rights influences all that the three arms of the South African state does, including 
the judiciary’s application of the common to a set of facts before it. This statement 
can be taken to mean that the court must, mero motu, take into account the 
relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights when applying the law of delict to a 
particular set of facts.479  
The application of Constitutional norms in this way is known as the ‘indirect 
horizontal application.’ This term describes the way in which Constitutional norms 
seep into the existing common law.480 The purpose of indirect horizontal application 
is to interpret the law and the ‘spirit’ of the Bill of Rights in such a way as to avert 
any inconsistency between such an existing legal provision and constitutional 
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norms.481 The goal of this process is to ensure that the common law falls within the 
constitutional framework and then to ultimately achieve a single, coherent system 
of South African law.482 It is therefore sometimes necessary to develop the common 
law to fit into this constitutional mould. Unfortunately, the law of indirect 
horizontal application is relatively still undeveloped in South Africa. No court has 
attempted to comprehensively pronounce on the meaning of section 39(2) or to 
explicate exactly how this section must be applied in practice. Roederer483 believes 
that it is probably unrealistic to expect this of the judiciary and that lawyers should 
be content rather to make sense of the ‘varied judgments grappling with, on the 
one hand, existing rules, rights and duties under the common law and legislation, 
and on the other, a range partially coherent partially competing values (spirit, 
objects, purposes) of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.’ What follows is an 
attempt to do just that. 
The most comprehensive precedent for the development of the law of delict in the 
light of the Constitution is a two-pronged test laid down in Carmichele v The 
Minister of Safety and Security and Another.484 According to this test, the court 
must firstly determine whether the common law needs to be developed and if so, 
whether a recommended development of the common law should be sanctioned or 
not. Commentary on these vague guidelines suggests that the Bill of Rights will 
typically be infused into open-ended or policy-type common law rules such as ‘boni 
mores’ or ‘unlawfulness.’485 These ‘open –ended’ policy-type enquiries must be 
approached by replacing or supplementing the public’s subjective perspectives of 
prevailing norms and values with the objective value system of the Constitution as 
the criteria on which these policy-type questions are answered.486 In this way, 
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section 39(2) does ‘not place a knife in the hand of the judge with which the 
common law should be beheaded, but simply provides clay with which an artwork 
should be moulded that can withstand the heat of the oven’ *own translation+.487  
If one accepts that the law of delict needs to be developed in order for it to be an 
effective legal device to address climate change adaptation, then the way in which 
unlawfulness needs to be developed needs to be described. Once again, legal 
precedent and relevant Constitutional principles, values and rights can provide us 
with some guidelines. 
Firstly, a ‘rule of law’ can be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to the ‘spirit, 
object and purport’ of the Bill of Rights. In Minister of Safety and Security v 
Hamilton,488 for example, the court was asked to consider whether police officials 
dispensed with their statutory duties under the Arms and Ammunitions Act 75 of 
1969 by mechanically processing applications. The court found that police officials 
were required to screen certain applications by asking relevant questions that 
would serve to corroborate the veracity of the information put before the police 
officer concerned.489 In substantiation such a construction of the Act, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal made reference of the right to life, dignity and security of the 
person enshrined in the Bill of Rights.490 In the same way, the statutes and policies 
relevant to climate change adaptation may well be interpreted in such a way as to 
give effect to the precautionary principle and the right to an environment that is not 
harmful to well-being.491 ‘Dynamic coastal processes’ as a factor that needs to be 
taken into account when an environmental impact assessment is being undertaken 
in the coastal zone, may well also be interpreted to include the future climate-
induced change.    
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Secondly, the Constitution can play an important role in the interplay among the 
factors specific to the case. The courts will do well to consider that government is 
obliged to take reasonable ‘legislative and other measures’ within its means to 
ensure an environment that is not harmful to health and well-being.492 An 
environment that causes extensive and regular damage to a person’s coastal 
property is submitted to be inimical to the ‘well-being’ of that person. The courts 
may well also make reference of the precautionary principle as something that must 
influence public authorities’ specific ‘legislative and other measures.’ It may be 
found that these measures should have prevented future climate-related damage.  
An absence of climate change adaption policies also fly in the face of South Africa’s 
obligations at international law, or more specifically the UNFCCC, to ensure that 
people and property are protected from climate change.  
4.4 Comparing the duty to adapt to climate change under tort Law and the law of 
delict 
Delict and the tort of negligence are both general remedies for negligent conduct 
and are similar in form and requirements: both actions require the plaintiff to show 
conduct, negligence, causation and damage. However, the requirement of 
unlawfulness in delict differs somewhat from the requirement of duty of care in 
tort. In the latter, ‘reasonable foreseeability’ is the threshold requirement, which is 
not an element of unlawfulness. In Queensland, thus, the likelihood, as perceived 
by the courts, of the climate change effects materialising will play a much bigger 
role in negligence, than it would in delict. The interpretation of the UNFCCC’s 
classification of ‘likely’ and ‘highly likely’ may well be crucial in a future Australian 
claim for lack of climate change adaptation.  
 The ‘salient factors’ in negligence, on the other hand, are very similar to the various 
guiding factors in the law of delict. The relevant factors in both were a strong 
relationship between the parties, prior conduct and control. Moreover, in duty of 
care and unlawfulness alike, a legal duty must be found to exist for an omission to 
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be negligent or unlawful. Therefore, in both jurisdictions, the courts must find that 
the relevant public authorities were in control of adaptation and thus created 
reliance by coastal property owners on the services of these authorities. Moreover, 
the relationship must be ‘proximate’ enough for there to be a legal duty; in other 
words, public authorities must be found to owe a legal duty to act to prevent 
property damage in coastal regions to specifically those that have suffered damage 
and not to the public at large. The present identifiability of areas endangered by 
climate change, hence, may well be crucial to the outcome of such a case. 
Both unlawfulness and duty of care are limited by the doctrine of the separation of 
powers. This limitation, however, is much more pronounced in Australia than it is in 
South Africa. In Australia, executive and legislative decisions and laws relating to the 
effectiveness of climate change adaptation policy may well be excluded from 
judicial scrutiny. Even the implementation of these policies may be found to be non-
justiciable, especially those that have a strong discretionary fiscal element. If the 
law of the ‘political question’ doctrine is not developed in Australia, it may well be 
found that there is a judicial check only IDAS-related decisions. In South Africa, on 
the other hand, there are no established rules governing the application of the 
separation of powers in the law of delict. However, it can be said that a strong 
‘polycentric’ decision is not to be decided on by the courts. Decisions with 
budgetary implications, such as omitting to identify the effects of climate change on 
the coastal zone as a priority for climate change adaptation initiatives, may well be 
found to be outside of the court’s jurisdiction.  
An additional hindrance to establishing a duty of care to adapt the coast to climate 
change is the Civil Liability Act. The significance of this hindrance may well depend 
on the interpretation of ‘obvious’ risks and ‘inherent’ risks. If courts interpret these 
words in the context of ‘risk society,’ climate-related damage may well not be found 
to be an ‘inherent’ or an ‘obvious risk.’ 
Perhaps the most significant difference between duty of care and unlawfulness is 
the application of the Constitution in the latter. The indirect horizontal application 












precautionary principle, can more easily infiltrate the Roman-Dutch law than in the 
English common law. A South African court in the future may well find that 
preventative action was necessary to guard against future climate ills, in order to 
ensure an environment that is not harmful to the owners of coastal private 
property’s well-being. Such a finding, it is submitted, will ensure coherence 
between the common law and the environmental regulatory system in that 
jurisdiction. The Australian common law, on the other hand, is in danger of falling 
behind more modern perceptions of how it is expected of government to deal with 
environmental risks, such as climate change. The development of the common law 
in this jurisdiction between now and when the climate change becomes a threat to 
coastal property owners may well be significant to a future judgment. The question 
will be if the Australian common law has shaken its ‘Victorian bias’ by then.        
 
5. Conclusion 
The UNFCCC is confident that sea-level rise and coastal inundation will be problems 
the next generation of people will have to face. Climate change adaptation is 
therefore an inherently moral issue as those living today will not be affected as 
severely thereby as will the next generation. This moral issue is identified as a major 
threat to future coastal inhabitants by the member States of the UNFCCC, who have 
accepted that adaptation is necessary to guard against future climate change risk. 
However, no formal binding agreements have been made by the Conference of the 
Parties to this Framework Convention, probably owing to the hesitancy of 
committing to obligations with huge financial implications that may well not benefit 
those currently living.  
It is submitted that the climate change adaptation policy and statutory regimes in 
Queensland and South Africa generally follow the international trend. Governments 
in both jurisdictions have claimed responsibility for a safe environment, now and in 












substance to this responsibility, especially in the context of climate change 
adaptation, but are not under an obligation to adapt to climate change. At most, 
planning authorities in both jurisdictions have a discretion to ‘have regard to’ 
climate change when making decisions. However, it is submitted that a climate 
change adaptation duty is more compatible with the Queensland regime than it is 
with the South African regime. Queensland’s planning law framework is more 
cohesive and therefore more open to the incorporation of a climate change duty. 
The Queensland government, part of a developed country, also has greater 
adaptive capacity than the South African State and presumably therefore a better 
chance of giving effect to this duty. Moreover, the climate change adaptation 
‘hotspots’ have already been identified in Queensland, giving the Queensland 
adaptation regime more focus and a localised character. In contrast, the South 
African authorities do not even identify the predicted threats of climate change on 
the South African coastline as an adaptation priority. 
Whether the common law rules will provide a remedy for climate-related damage is 
also speculative. Statutes such as the CLA in Queensland may be modified or new, 
similar legislation may be promulgated in South Africa in order to prevent a claim in 
tort or delict for non-action on climate change adaption. In Queensland, the 
justiciablity of the claim will also depend heavily on what the role of the courts will 
be at that stage in policy-making. Only if the judicial check on the executive and 
legislative law-making powers is accentuated between now and when the claim is 
instituted, can the courts make a meaningful contribution to climate change 
adaptation. In South Africa, courts are more willing to enter the policy-making 
realm, but are mindful of the constraints on an overburdened government to fulfil 
its socio-economic duties. Therefore, it is submitted that the degree of success in 
poverty alleviation efforts between now and when the claim is instituted will be 
crucial to the outcome of such a hypothetical claim. 
If a claim in tort or delict is heard on the merits, the plaintiff’s case will stand and 












development of the common law has been conservative in nature, despite its 
obvious non-compatibility with modern environmental issues. Despite having 
enshrined environmental principles in important policy documents and legislation, 
the courts have no duty to base decisions impacting on the environment on these 
principles. The South African judicature has been similarly cautious in being overly 
expansive in its development of the Roman-Dutch Law. However, the Constitution 
offers a litigator an opportunity to justify development of the common law. There is 
certainly room to argue that the Constitution makes it mandatory for courts to 
consider environmental principles such as the preventative principles and inter-
generational equity in common law matters. The South African common law is 
therefore more flexible and is more open to developing an inherent climate change 
adaptation duty than the Australian system. 
If there is not, or will never be, an adaptation duty in law, governments might well 
be slow and hesitant to devise and implement effective adaptation measures. This 
is an unacceptable situation for ‘risk society,’ who demands that risks are 
adequately managed by their governments. It is ideal for post-industrial society that 
people are not afraid of climate change, but that governments are afraid of the 
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